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Background and Overview 
INTRODUCTION 
HISTORICAL LITERATURE CONTAINS numerous references to irrigation systems managed  by 
local communities.  The British  Colonial  Government,  for example, operated  a research 
institution called the “Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab” and its studies surveying agricul- 
tural conditions in Northern India have described the operation of canals by local communities 
(Board of Economic Inquiry 1933). Dutch civil servants have recorded irrigation practices in 
Bali and Java and British civil servants have written about tanks used for irrigation in South 
India.  Anthropological  field  studies  and  irrigation  ethnographies  give  details  of  highly 
organized irrigation communities in numerous countries. 
Since the  1970s there have been  an  increasing number of field studies focusing on 
management activities of  systems that are operated by the irrigators themselves. These range 
from case studies spanning several agricultural years to rapid appraisals completed in a few 
days. 
The studies  have  presented  examples  of  effective  management  and  high  levels  of 
participation by fanners in acquiring and distributing the irrigation supply. It has also been 
noted that the irrigators in most cases are paying not only the full cost of operation and 
maintenance but also much of the capital mst for improving their systems. Collectively, these 
studies have raised awareness of a vast resource of irrigated agriculture that has received little 
attention from government agencies in the past decades of  rapid irrigation expansion. This 
paper uses examples from these studies to  examine issues related to improving irrigation 
management where local groups are responsible for irrigation operation and maintenance. 
DEFINING LOCALLY MANAGED IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
Numerous typologies are used to define irrigation entities. Size, nature of the water source, 
the governing body and levels of organization are among the most common. For constructing 
irrigation systems, irrigation agencies have found it useful to classify systems in ways that 
facilitate technical and administrative input. For example, separate units are usually respon- 
sible for groundwater and gravity system development, and the responsibility for small and 
large systems generally rests with different groups. 
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Support of operation and maintenance is possibly better addressed by grouping systems 
according to management input. Hunt (1989) suggests that determining who has the “charter 
of authority” is a useful way to distinguish among management types. The charter refers to 
the source of legitimacy for the authority to govern the system. The person or group that holds 
the charter of authority has ultimate control in shaping the way the system operates. Holders 
of the charter of authority create or confirm the institutions that shape the system. 
Private individuals and companies own and operate some irrigation systems. However, 
the focus of irrigation development and management interest is centered on the large number 
of  systems that are public property. Increasingly, there is also attention given to systems 
operated as common property. 
Agenciesin many countries aregiven the authority by thegovemment todevelop,operate, 
maintain, and regulate irrigation activities. Where agency staff have the major responsibility 
to manage most operation and maintenance activities of a system, the system is often referred 
to as agency-managed. While there are possibly some systems that are entirely managed by 
agency staff, in most cases, the irrigators have some role in managing irrigation delivery, at 
least in the channels near their fields. Such systems would perhaps best be termed jointly 
managed as suggested by Coward (1980). While acknowledging the validity of both formal 
and informal roles performed by fanners in these systems, the term agency-managed will be 
used in this paper to refer to systems where the charter of authority appears to be largely with 
the government-appointed agency. 
Historically, while centralized states have invested in irrigation development, there has 
usually been parallel activity by individual cultivators or groups of farmers, sponsored perhaps 
by local rulers or landowners, who have also constructed irrigation systems. Some of these 
systems date back to hundreds of years and have well-established institutions for managing 
operation and maintenance. Though these systems are generally small in  size, their vast 
number collectively makes them  a significant factor in  agricultural production in  many 
countries. Some systems divert water from natural, unregulated streams. In South India and 
Sri Lanka, numerous systems, perhaps as many as several hundred thousand, disttibute water 
from  tanks replenished by water harvested from a catchment rather than from ariver diversion. 
Karez irrigation systems (called qanat in Iran and foggara in North Africa) are found in many 
countries around the world, with a major concentration in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 
These systems tap the water bearing alluvial fans at the base of mountains and lead it through 
gently sloping tunnels to the surface, sometimes many miles out in the plains (Rahman 1981). 
Lift irrigation from wells and surface sources is expanding rapidly, often with little or no direct 
assistance from central government agencies. 
Martin et al. (1986) used  the term  “fanner-managed” for systems where cultivators 
controlled the irrigation enterprise including control of access to water from a natural source. 
In fanner-managed systems, the authority for allocating the irrigation resource rests with the 
community of  irrigators. Some systems have many, but not  all, of  the characteristics of 
farmer-managedsystems.  Irrigation district  sin  the western United States, forexample,include 
all land that could potentially be irrigated in their tax base, in some cases even land occupied 
by municipalities. This gives nonirrigating property owners the right to participate in the 
management of the irrigation districts. Lansing (1987) determined that the priests in the temple 
system play an important role in managing irrigation in subaks (local-level fanners’ organi- CHAF’ER  I  3 
zations for irrigation) of  several watersheds in Bali, Indonesia. The local government is 
technically in control of small irrigation systems in Java. Though many local officials are 
fanners, some operate other businesses. The term “locally managed irrigation system” is used 
in this paper to encompass all fanner-managed and other systems where the charter of 
authority is with the local community. 
In a locally managed system, the leaders come from the local area, do much of  their 
business there, and intend to stay there. The leadership is committed, in one way or another, 
to the local scene and the outcome of the irrigation enterprise. Organization in these systems 
comes about in the broadest sense to coordinate the flow of resources necessary to accomplish 
irrigation delivery in a way that could not be done individually. Coordination is necessary 
because of the complexity and interrelatedness of the many tasks that must be performed. 
IRRIGATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 
Heavy investment in the 1960s and the 1970s has created many new irrigation systems. But 
both developing-country governments and donor agencies now recognize that the rate of 
economic return assumed during the design of recent projects has not always been achieved. 
Further, since the better sites are already developed, new projects in the future will have even 
greater difficulty  achieving effective returns. The current assessment in  some countries, 
particularly in Asia, is that the most economical advancement in irrigated agriculture can be 
achieved by improving the performance of existing systems rather than by building new ones 
(Kikuchi 1992). 
Locally managed systems were largely ignored during the period of rapid construction of 
new systems. Their small size and  simple, even crude, construction did not attract much 
interest except for them to be incorporated into larger schemes or in some cases to be upgraded 
with entirely new physical facilities. However, as concern in the 1980s turned to improving 
management and recovering investment in  systems constructed in  the previous decades, 
attention has been drawn to the successful operation and sustained maintenance accomplished 
by some of the locally managed systems. 
Locally managed systems have several attractive features. The most obvious is that in 
many countries they have drawn on few public resources for their creation and, to a large 
extent, are self-supporting in their continued operation. In agency-managed systems tight 
operation and maintenance budgets together with poor payment of irrigation fees by irrigators 
have given policymakers in many countries reason to press consideration of options other than 
agency management of irrigation. 
Another attractive  feature of locally managed systems is their decentralized self-manage- 
ment. In some circumstances,  this has gained them recognition as a viable alternative  to agency 
management. Though there is some question as to whether new locally managed systems can 
be created, policymakers generally agree that the existing systems should continue to operate 
independently. At a time when weak management is cited as a possible reason for less than 
optimum performance of agency-managed systems, the participatory management style of 
locally managed systems is sometimes held up as a model. 4  CHAPTER  I 
Case studies of  locally managed systems have focused on systems that are operating rather 
well. This has tended to present a picture of highly motivated Irrigators successfully managing 
their limited resources under severe conditions. While this is certainly the case in numerous 
systems in numerous countries, many locally managed systems are not performing up to their 
potential. Irrigators in a large number of  systems seek assistance from irrigation agencies and 
other departments to reduce their maintenance costs and increase system reliability. The 
opportunity for improving and expanding locally managed systems is viewed as important for 
further irrigation development. The number of donor-supported programs to assist existing 
locally managed irrigation systems has increased in the past few years. 
The success of local management has prompted the initiation of programs for turning over 
to local management some systems that are currently operated and maintained by irrigation 
agencies. Since some systems were originally built and managed by irrigators and became the 
responsibility of a government agency only subsequent to improvement  activities, these 
systems are proposed to be “turned back” to local management. Other programs are suggesting 
that parts of large systems be transferred to users to improve user participation. The suggestion 
is that the main system could be operated and maintained by  the agency similar to a river 
course from which many locally managed systems acquire their irrigation supply. As with 
river courses where there are many interrelated systems, these locally managed systems must 
also become responsible participants in main system management. 
Three rather different irrigation development programs -  assistance to existing systems, 
turnover of  management and management transfer of parts of systems -  are interested in how 
locally managed irrigation systems accomplish operation and maintenance. This paper draws 
on examples from field studies to examine issues that relate to these three programs. 
Assistance to Locally Managed Irrigation Systems 
Thousands of locally managed systems exist in many countries. They have tremendously 
varied experiences in managing their own affairs. Some have exemplary mles and procedures 
that are strictly enforced while others are not able to fully maintain their system as a result of 
which irrigation delivery suffers. At times, well-managed systems face natural calamities for 
which they need external assistance. Other systems need assistance to improve their perform- 
ance and to remain sustainable. 
Irrigators generally request that permanent structures be built to replace the temporary 
ones that they  are  struggling to  maintain. Replacing broken  or temporary  structures  in 
well-managed systems may be all that is necessary, but in other systems the poor physical 
status of the system may be a symptom of  ineffective institutions. Assistance programs need 
to enable the irrigators to strengthen their rules and procedures and make their operation and 
maintenance activities more effective. 
If  a large number of  locally managed systems exist in a country, there is a tremendous 
resource of experience for operating and maintaining systems. Though, frequently, there are 
similarities in the way organizations are structured or in the rules and procedures they use, 
there are unique features in each as well. Assistance programs should tap this experience and CHAPER  I  5 
diversity to offer an array of  options for each issue that needs to be addressed. If these systems 
are to remain independent, assistance procedures must enable the irrigators to camy out the 
work in a way that builds their capacity for future operation and maintenance. 
Turnover of Management 
Improving the performance of agency-managed systems has received increased attention as 
investment in new systems has slowed down. Improvement is perceived as possible because 
many systems are irrigating far less area than anticipated during the design of the system. 
Frequently, cropping intensities are also lower than expected and projected increases in yield 
seldom achieve the level targeted during project preparation. 
There are many reasons for this situation. In some cases, the amount of water assumed 
during design is not available. In others, farmers prefer crops different from those planned 
because of low market prices. In  many cases, the problems do not reflect faults in system 
management. However, they exacerbate the dilemma managers in many agency-managed 
systems face where farmers are reluctant to pay the full irrigation fee charged for their use of 
the system. In many systems the fees collected are not sufficient to cover expenditure for 
operation  and  maintenance.  After  three decades  of  intensive  development  aud  massive 
investment in building irrigation works, there is little progress toward recovery of the capital 
invested in irrigation. 
In order to improve imgation performance and to transfer the operation and maintenance 
cost to the irrigators, programs have been initiated in a number of countries to turn over the 
management of entire systems to the irrigators for them to operate and maintain. The objective 
is to transform the system from being agency-managed to being locally managed, Turnover 
programs  generally  make considerable  investment in  improving the physical  system by 
repairing or replacing broken structures before turnover. In many cases there is also intensive 
effort to work with the irrigators to form an organization and establish rules and procedures 
for operating and maintaining the system. 
Systems proposed for turnover tend to be small. Some were initially constructed and 
operated by the fanners but in the process of  receiving assistance they were entered in an 
agency's roster of systems and continued to receive some maintenance support. The size and 
nature of most systems proposed for turnover are often similar to locally managed systems in 
nearby locations. 
Incentives for irrigators to take over systems are mixed. Where there are clear advantages 
for fanners to he involved at all levels of system operation and maintenance, they are likely 
to be already involved and the incentive to take on full responsibility is high. Where systems 
are  running  smoothly,  farmers  may  prefer  the  status quo.  Fanners in  systems that are 
performing below expectation may be reluctant to accept responsibility unless they are given 
formal authority to change the way the system is operated. In many countries, transferring 
authority and implementing other incentives that support program goals require changes in 
national policy. 6  CHAPTER 1 
Transfer of Management 
In most agency-managed systems, fanners perform irrigation activities at the field channel or 
tertiary level. In some cases, increasing fanner participation in system management has 
resulted in improving the system performance. One method proposed for increasing partici- 
pation is to transfer full management control of  segments of large agency-managed systems 
to fanners. In such instances, a central agency is to continue to manage irrigation delivery to 
some point  in  the  distribution  network. Below  that  point, control  of  all  operation  and 
maintenance activities is to become the responsibility of an organization managed by the 
irrigators. Together with shifting fanner management higher in the system, the relationship 
between the agency and fanners is to be spelled out in a more formal charter. 
Questions are raised by those skeptical of  these arrangements. They argue that irrigators 
under such arrangements would face quite different incentives than those in locally managed 
systems who acquire their water from natural sources. In particular, they would have less 
authority to take action when their irrigation supply diminishes and they get little feedback of 
the  results of  action above their  system. This would result in  the irrigators taking  less 
responsibility for poor management on their part and placing blame on the agency for poor 
irrigation delivery. Others propose to overcome this problem by increasing irrigator partici- 
pation in management of the main system at the same time that full authority is transferred to 
them at lower levels in the system. 
Country-specific, or even site-specific conditions may influence the view taken. Experi- 
ence in many developing countries is still limited but largely suggests that escape from the 
social environment of  the agency bureaucracy may not be easy. Tang (1992) argues that 
participation  of  fanners in  bureaucratic irrigation systems will  succeed only  if  both  the 
organizational problems of the bureaucratic machinery and the structure of  incentives facing 
irrigators are corrected. If the supply of water to the watercourse is highly unpredictable and 
depends entirely on the arbitrary decisions of officials operating at the system level, it is hard 
to expect farmers to organize among themselves to undertake operation and maintenance at 
the watercourse level. Achieving locally managed  conditions in  the transferred  parts of 
agency-managed systems is desirable but many are skepticalof the viability of  this model in 
all countries. 
OBJECTIVE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
This paper examines the construction and operation and maintenance tasks that shape the 
nature of locally managed irrigation systems. While lift irrigation from groundwater and 
surface sources is among the fastest growing sectors of  locally managed irrigation, and 
irrigation from tanks is an important resource in large segments of some countries, most of 
the examples are drawn from surface diversion systems. The objective is to identify relevant 
experiences and lessons for staff who are responsible for working with  locally managed 
systems in the types of programs mentioned above. Several examples are used to illustrate the 
broad range of institutions irrigators have developed to accomplish essential irrigation tasks. CHAPTER  1  I 
The discussion  shows the implications that these tasks have for irrigation development 
programs. 
The view taken is that in organizing irrigation development where irrigation already 
exists, one needs to understand and be sensitive to the irrigators’ established institutions. 
Awareness of the range or configuration of rules is useful for the presentation of options that 
can be tailored to the specific needs. Examples are selected to illustrate the variety and 
complexity of rules and actions that local groups have found useful. 
In many developing countries, construction of most irrigation works is currently imple- 
mented by  a government agency. This facilitates central planning and financing, especially 
when foreign donors are involved. It simplifies contracting for construction since the imple- 
menting agency is a government body. It also makes appropriation of land and water rights 
easier in some cases. While such features expedite the development of  irrigation, they also 
lead to the alienation of the very fanners whom the irrigation system intends to serve. With 
little or no control over the irrigation resource, farmers tend to be critical of the service they 
receive. The attitude prevails that the system belongs to the government, so  that fanners take 
little or no responsibility for operation and maintenance. The chapter reviewing construction 
proposes that constructiodimprovement activities be used as a management training exercise 
to establish local ownership. 
Thechapter on water acquisition  deals withgaining access andcontroloverwater in anatural 
source.  Waterrightsamonguserssharingthesamesourceare~uentlyoverl~kedindealingwith 
locally managed systems. Where state governments have not established legislative regulations, 
local rules have generally evolved which need to be understood by  the project providing assistance. 
Irrigation allocation and irrigation distribution are two tasks often undertaken almost 
simultaneously. They are covered in separate chapters to highlight the importance of each. 
Irrigation allocation is used to refer to the “within system” water rights. They are the rules 
that govern how each member of the system gains entitlement to use the irrigation supply and 
how  the supply is to  be  apportioned in time  and space among the members. Irrigation 
distribution is referred to as the method and means of physically delivering the irrigation 
supply. The objective of  irrigation management is to deliver irrigation according to the 
allocation rules or plan. 
Resource mobilization is dealt with in a separate  chapter because of its central role in the 
success of locally managed irrigation systems. The need to mobilize resources is primarily 
for system maintenance and improvement. The type and intensity of maintenance needed is 
highly site-specific. There are also large differences in the use of labor and material between 
cash economies  and subsistence  communities. The ability of local groups tocraft rules to make 
effective use of  their resources illustrates the potential of local management. 
The structure of irrigation organizations and the supporting activities of decision making, 
accounting, communication and conflict management are discussed in yet another chapter. 
The organizational form is shaped by a variety of factors. The size of the system influences 
the number of organization levels and the way decisions  are made. Maintenance requirements 
not only determine resource mobilization procedures but have a dominating effect on the role 
of leadership, type of records kept, and methods of communication. CHAPTER 2 
System Construction and Physical Improvement 
PHYSICALIMPROVEMWTSARE  often necessary when a system is in operation. One reason is to 
overcome deficiencies that become evident only after the system begins operation. Improve- 
ments to overcome deficiencies include those related to reducing the cost of maintenance, 
better water control and decreasing water loss from seepage and leakage. Another reason for 
making improvements is the desire to enlarge the system by modifying, improving or adding 
structures. This is especially true when users build systems by trial and error rather than by 
engineering design. However, the most common reason for continued  physical improvements 
after constructing a system is to rectify subsequent deterioration that takes place. If mainte- 
nance does not keep pace  with natural  decay  of  the system  it will eventually  reach an 
inoperable state. 
All structures must be planned and designed before they are built. Investigation must be 
done in the field to determine the size and type of  structure that best fits the foundation 
conditions. Materials must be collected and labor expended in preparing the site. The term 
“system construction”  is used here to include all of the work that goes into planning,  designing, 
preparing, and building the physical works of the irrigation system, whether for a totally new 
system or improvement of parts of an existing one. However, the process of system construc- 
tion or making physical improvements has the potential for achieving much more than the 
creation of physical structures. 
Construction is  an  activity  with  rich  opportunity  for giving experience in  making 
decisions, formulating rules and procedures, and developing  leadership skills. All of these are 
essential for effective operation and maintenance of the completed physical works. There are 
other reasons  for involving the irrigators in the construction  activity, especially in  the 
improvement of existing systems. They have ideas about the priority of improvements that 
need to be made based on their observation of  local conditions over many seasons. When 
irrigators contribute to the cost of improvements they help control unnecessary expenditure 
(WECS/IIMI 1990). Possibly the most important is that irrigator  involvement in the construc- 
tion activities is a property-forming activity that enables them to claim “real ownership”  rather 
than a “sense of ownership.” Ownership is an important factor in fostering irrigator respon- 
sibility for operation and maintenance (Ambler 1992). 
Many  of  the agronomic, physicalfenvironmental, and  social variables  that must  be 
considered in construction of the physical system are highly site-specific. The nature of the 
water source, availability of storage facilities, type of  crop. and land-tenure relationships  are 
but a few of the factors that must be examined. Selection of the appropriate design, attention 
to technical detail and quality of  construction are important but on their own they  are not 
sufficient conditions to ensure fulfillment of most system management objectives. While the 
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technical aspects of the construction are important, construction is more than assembling a 
series of technically “correct” irrigation structures at the lowest cost in the shortest possible 
time. Institutions -  the working rules -  must also be created to make the structures fully 
effective. 
For many, though not all, locally managed irrigation systems, the process of construction 
provides a wide range of  experience that enables participants to begin what Ostrom (1992) 
has termed “crafting” institutions for governing their system. This chapter examines how the 
act of  constructing the irrigation works can influence management. It is suggested that in 
situations where assistance is being provided to locally managed systems or to those that are 
to become locally managed through management transfer or turnover, the accompanying 
construction or physical improvement activity be  made a tool for building management 
capacity. 
FARMER INVOLVEMENT IN SYSTEM  CONSTRUCTION 
Groups of farmers living in isolated communities all over the world have recognized the value 
of  irrigation and have worked together to construct irrigation systems. By  pooling their 
resources they have accomplished much more than has been possible by the labor of individual 
families. Though such situations are often fraught with conflict, the incentive of reliable and 
increased production has motivated the development of creative ways to manage differences. 
The need to move ahead with construction in ways acceptable to all participants forces fanners 
to find ways to make collective  decisions.  They have adapted the process of  institution  building 
to their sociocultural experience in the same way that the structures built have been tailored 
to fit the physical environment. 
Coward (1986) examined the relationship between private investment of fanners’ (indi- 
viduals and groups) in irrigation works and the creation of hydraulic property. He suggested 
that development of irrigated agriculture is a property-creating process and that the creation 
of irrigation facilities establishes property relations that determine and shape operation and 
maintenance practices. 
These relations become the social basis  for collective action by irrigators in perform- 
ing various irrigation  tasks.  Cam1  cleaning can be seen as  a group action being taken 
by individuals whose relationships with one another are based, in a large pan, on 
the interrelationships which arise because of their common positions with regani to 
hydraulic property which they have created or acquired. 
The following examples are used to illustrate the effect of creating property relations 
through construction and the impact this has on operation and maintenance. The examples are 
drawn from systems where the irrigators constructed the original system. However, there are 
many locally managed systems that were not constructed by the users. In some cases, agents 
of the government, a local ruler, or a large landlord constructed and operated the system for 
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irrigation systems that eventually became locally managed. In recent years, irrigators have 
taken over systems built by a variety of government agencies. Institutions have also evolved 
in these cases. However, few studies document the process by which this has taken place or 
over what period of time. 
Locally Built and Managed Systems 
Peopk’s Ditch Company, Central Valley California, USA. The People’s Ditch Company is 
one of many mutual companies in California’s Central Valley incorporated in the 1870s.  The 
charter members’ objective was to build and operate an irrigation system to serve the fields 
they had acquired as settlers. The company issued stock on the basis of one share fpr every 
square mile (259 ha) that was to be served by the canal they proposed to build (Maass and 
Anderson 1978). Initially, they issued 100 shares each with a value of US$l00.00. However, 
the shares were distributed in fractions and, typically, a share was divided among four or more 
fanners. 
Many of the original settlers paid their assessment with labor because they had little cash. 
Much of the work consisted of digging the canal. In some sections, the canal was divided into 
Sectors and each stockholder assigned a sector to dig. In others, the estimated cost of the work 
was assessed and a stockholder could work off his levy at the fixed wage rate per day. In order 
to pay for an engineer or superintendent of works, and to pay for supplies such as lumber to 
construct control structures, the elected directors of the company assessed the shares of the 
stockholders to raise the money. 
The total command area for which shares were issued by the People’s Ditch Company in 
1873  was26.000ha.By  1918,thecompanyoperatedasystemofnearly  100kmofmaincanals 
which were the collective  responsibility of all irrigators. In addition, well over 100 km of main 
and lateral canals were operated by smaller groups of shareholder fanners. 
A meeting of the shareholders is held annually. The primary activity is to elect a board 
of directors for a one-year term. Other agenda items include consideration of any proposed 
amendments to the company’s articles of incorporation and bylaws, proposed changes in the 
capital stock, and reports from company officers. When the fanners are frustrated with their 
water supply or when they expect an important decision to be made they attend meetings. 
Frequently, however, the meetings are prly  attended and a quorum is achieved only by the 
use of proxies. Poor attendance is taken as an indication of satisfaction with current conditions. 
Maass and Anderson (1978)  characterize the mutual irrigation companies of the Central 
Valley in California as “cooperative, democratic institutions that delivered water at cost to 
their stockholders only ....” They described the constluction of several systems incorporated 
in 1873 as follows: 
The  farmers brought water to the W  laying out and building the canals themselves. 
For thispurpose they incorporatedmutual cad  companies in which they tookshares 
of stock  These shares were then assessed for the cost of building the canals and 
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use waterfrom a canal was in proportion to the number of shares he acquired. The 
share of  stock in a mutual irrigation company was therefore distinctive in that it 
represented not only a proportional part of the ownership of the company, which in 
the early days had little, if any, value but also a right to receive water and,  most 
important, an obligation to pay a proportion of  the costs of building the canal and 
operating it.  ... 
Thulo Kulo in Chherlung, Palpa. Nepal. The southern foothills of the Himalayan Mountains 
have deeply incised rivers that drain the snowmelt from the higher mountains. However, the 
huge water resource that this represents is virtually inaccessible for irrigation by gravity 
delivery to fields because of the hilly terrain. Smaller side streams are tapped to irrigate the 
hill slopes. In many cases, canals must be cut into steep slopes in order to lead the water from 
a stream to the fields. The lower valleys have a warm climate where crops can be grown 
throughout the year if irrigation is available. 
An important factor in developing and operating irrigation in this environment is the 
ability to  mobilize sufficient labor, first to construct the system and then  to continually 
maintain it. Floods in the steep-sloped stream regularly destroy the diversion structure and 
landslides repeatedly block the canal, requiring the ability to respond quickly to emergencies. 
In addition, there is the regular maintenance required to clean and reshape the earthen canals 
that deteriorate quickly. The need for maintenance labor requires unity within the irrigator 
community. This necessitates establishment and close adherence to rules that embody accept- 
able equity in sharing the irrigation resource and in the work necessary to bring irrigation to 
the farm. 
In 1925. the land-limited community of Chherlung in Palpa District, Nepal was populated 
by  about 50 families. Their rain-fed agriculture production was not keeping pace with the 
growing population. Two individuals encouraged others to join them in constructing a canal 
to lead water from a small stream about 6 km away to irrigate their fields. They argued that 
if  they did not invest in constructing an irrigation system some families would be forced to 
leave the community within a few years in search of more land. About half of the population 
agreed to assist with this expensive and risky venture and half remained skeptical about their 
ability to bring water so far through difficult terrain and declined to invest. So, in response to 
food shortages, the Thulo Kulo Irrigation System was built by the cooperation of some, but 
not all, Chherlung residents (Yoder 1986). 
Without financial assistancefrom outside thecommunity, the Chherlung fanners contrib- 
utedtheirownlaboroverafour-yearperiodtocompleteasmallcanal.  They hiredlocalexperts 
in canal building to lay out the alignment and construct the channel through difficult sections. 
They reportedly sold jewelry and some land to pay for this assistance. When a small trickle 
of water was successfully delivered after four years of work it confirmed the alignment and 
proved to the skeptics in the community that irrigation was possible. 
In the process of carrying out the construction, the group discovered that they needed a 
leader with skills in organizing the work -  a leader they all trusted to distribute the workload 
fairly and to keep records of each household’s contribution. They found that they needed to 
hold frequent planning meetings where they could discuss and eventually agree on the details 
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to do the job. Because of the enormous amount of work that needed to be done, they needed 
cooperation from all members. They learned by experience that a working agreement was 
necessary before proceeding with an activity or else some members would not cooperate. 
Disagreements and misunderstanding over decisions they  had reached earlier resulted in 
assigning one person to write a record of the discussion at meetings and have all participants 
sign the record to attest their agreement. Because. many of the fanners were illiterate they 
initiated the practice of reading the minutes aloud at the end of each meeting before asking 
those attending to sign. 
By  continuing to invest in  improving the system and also by  successfully soliciting 
assistance from the government in the past few decades to purchase cement and hire masons 
to line the canal, the system is now reliably irrigating three crops annually in all but a few 
hectares of the 40-ha command area. Well over 100 families were using the system in 1990. 
Some families were able to  sell surplus grain to neighboring communities. The rules and 
practices that evolved during construction are still being continued. Most have been  modified 
several times in the intervening  years to accommodate the many changes that have taken place. 
Subak  Gunung Mekar Mertasari, Bali, Indonesia.  Bali is widely known for its subaks that 
operate and maintain elaborate irrigation systems for intensive irrigated agriculture. Because 
of the high demand for water, intricate relationships have been worked out for sharing water 
along the natural water courses. Allocation of the limited irrigation supply among members 
within a system is also a sensitive task. 
Pitana (1991) describes an example in Bali similar to that of the Thulo Kulo. As recently 
as 1977, a group of 70 persons from the village of Bunutin in Kintamani District of Bali began 
construction of  a new  canal system entirely with their own resources. Construction was 
initiated to bring drinking water to the village because during periods of drought they needed 
to carry water 6 km along a steep trail. The canal is about 2.5 km long and more than half its 
length is through a tunnel. 
Because the entire village was to gain access to drinking water, all villagers voluntarily 
contributed some labor for the construction of  this canal. However, the bulk of the work and 
the payment of hired labor was the responsibility of the group that initiated the work. This 
group, which does not include all the villagers, formed an organization that they named “Subak 
Gunung Mekar Mertasari.” Water in excess of village drinking needs was divided among  the 
Subak members and used for irrigating new rice fields. The effort in bringing drinking water 
to  the  village and  using  the  excess supply for irrigation  were  highly  successful. This 
encouraged the group to search for an additional water source to allow expansion of  the 
irrigated area. 
The new source is estimated by the villagers to contain enough water to irrigate 75 ha of 
rice land but requires construction of a tunnel 3 km long. Construction work on this second 
canal started in 1980. In January 1991, about 1.2 km of  the tunnel remained to be dug. Except 
for consultation with authorities about the right to extract water from the stream, the subak 
members have not received assistance from outside the community. The villagers gave some 
voluntary labor in appreciation of a reliable drinking water supply. As with the first canal, 
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A ‘kater master’’ was appointed during construction and continues to supervise all the 
subak facilities from the river diversion to the field-division structures. While checking the 
canal and tunnel the water master makes minor repairs. If major repairs are required, the water 
master reports to the subak head who calls on additional members to assist with the repairs. 
The water master also supervises irrigation distribution. The  canal is cleaned eight times each 
year. Shares of  water can be traded or sold. The water share carries with it the proportional 
responsibility of maintaining the system. 
Consequences of Farmer Construction 
The articles of incorporation for the People’s Ditch Company in California  established a legal 
framework for decision making and clearly spelled out the entitlements and responsibilities 
of the shareholders. Before the company could be incorporated, the organizers had to establish 
many of the principles that would govern the construction and would later be carried over into 
the operation and maintenance of  the system. Though there were other similar models of 
organization evolving simultaneously in the California Central Valley, the shareholders had 
to consider their own situation and tailor the rules to meet their own needs. Since the agreement 
was worked out before starting construction, shareholders knew the obligations that they had 
and the possible benefits they would receive. 
In the Thulo Kulo and Subak Gunung systems, there were long, intensive discussions 
among the villagers about the risk of  investing in such a massive project. Extensive investi- 
gation was made by farmers to determine the canal layout and/or tunnel alignment. Decisions 
to share the irrigation supply among households in proportion to labor and cash contributions 
for construction required detailed accounting. Successful recordkeeping built confidence and 
trust among the participants. As with the mutual companies, the Thulo Kulo and Subak 
Gunung systems decided that future maintenance would be done in proportion to the share of 
water held by each household. Thus the effort put into devising an accounting method for 
labor and cash contribution during construction was directly applicable to recording labor and 
cash for system maintenance. 
As work progressed and additional decisions needed to be made during the construction 
of the Thulo Kulo and Subak Gunung systems, a forum for orderly discussion and recording 
of agreements was worked out. These procedures were adopted for system operation after 
construction was complete. The intense effort necessary to move the Thulo Kulo and Subak 
Gunung construction ahead allowed each participant an opportunity to develop skills. In the 
Thulo Kulo, a person was identified with skills for leadership who also commanded respect 
for his even-handed dealing with his neighbors. He was appointed by consensus to lead the 
construction work. After construction was complete he was given authority for the day-to-day 
management of the system. 
The farmers of the People’s Ditch Company, the Thulo Kulo, and Suhak Gunung risked 
a great deal and suffered hardships before successfully completing their irrigation systems. 
The construction experience made a direct contribution to the “crafting” of  the rules and 
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maintenance and experience with the technology necessary to repair and improve the system 
were in place before water flowed in the canals. More important, the farmers had learned to 
work together in making and canying out decisions. Formulating new rules and modifying 
rules that are no longer appropriate have become routine at the annual meeting of the Thulo 
&lo.  Leadership in all three of these systems is accountable to the members and it can be 
changed by calling for an election. 
There are many thousands of systems around the world with stories similar to those of 
Chherlung Thulo Kulo, Subak Gunung Mekar Mertasari and the People's Ditch Company; 
stories that show farmers can successfully work  together to construct and manage their 
irrigation system. However, it is also important to recognize that cooperation among local- 
level groups is not automatic as is illustrated in the following example. 
Siran Tar Kulo, Nepd.' In 1986, an inventory of irrigation systems in the upper watershed of 
the Indrawati River identified 119 irrigation systems in an approximate area of  200 km*. 
Nineteen were selected as candidates for assistance  by a government agency because they had 
not yet developed the full potential of  their land and water resources. The Siran Tar Kulo was 
one of these systems. It was built in 1980 with an expenditure of 3,600 person-days of work 
and intended to irrigate a total of 24 ha (Acharaya 1989). About 60  households, without any 
assistance from the state, contributed to the original construction. However, they had serious 
problems in maintaining the canal and little water was delivered in the first few years. 
The canal was broken by landslides during critical irrigation periods each year. Many of 
the persons who had contributed to the original construction were discouraged because they 
did not receive water for their fields. Most concluded  that they could not maintain the system 
and refused to contribute additional labor. Only a few individuals continued their efforts to 
improve the canal. 
In the Siran Tar Kulo, most of the consultation and decision making were centered on the 
small group of  fanners near the pint where the canal entered the command area.  The 
participants in the original construction did not make a decision to quantify sharing the future 
water resource prior to starting work. The smaller group near the head of the command area 
decided on the alignment and invited others to share the work and in return have access to 
irrigation. When the water delivered by the canal did not get beyond the first few farms, others 
who had contributed to construction lost interest in continuing their investment. Leadership 
remained with the small group at the head of the system and was not accountable to the larger 
group of potential water users. 
While the physical work done to construct the Siran Tar Kulo was considerable, the 
farmers did not  make comparable progress in  formulating working rules  to  guide their 
activities. Their construction experience was not a property-creating activity for the entire 
group. No records were kept to quantify the contribution to construction by each household. 
Decision making and communication did not develop in a pattern similar to the Thulo Kulo 
and many other systems  in Nepal. Though the terrain was exceptionally difficult and landslides 
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were expected to continue until the slopes above and below the canal stabilized, construction 
and maintenance of the Siran Tar Kulo was not more difficult than many other successful hill 
systems in Nepal. 
Several possibilities are suggested for the observed organizational deficiencies in the 
Siran Tar System. These farmers had  little experience with mutual cooperation. Personal 
grievances influenced group interaction and since they  were not  yet  facing severe food 
shortages  they had less incentive for putting such problems aside than somecommunities even 
though it was clear all would benefit from a successful irrigation system. By contrast. farmers 
of the Thulo Kulo System and many that purchased shares in the mutual irrigation companies 
in California had few resources and were desperate to make their investment successful. Eight 
years after incorporating, and before. successful delivery of irrigation, nearly one-third of the 
stock issued by the People’s Ditch Company had beem forfeited because the stockholders could 
not pay the assessments when the cost of the canal exceeded original estimates. 
Siran Tar Kulo, unfortunately, is not the only example where farmers have not managed 
to work together to accomplish their goals. It is quite possible that similar conflicts were 
present among the farmers of  the Thulo Kulo System and that successful solutions were 
eventually worked out. Indeed, if the Thulo Kulo System had been examined six years after 
its original construction it may not have appeared any more successful than the Siran Tar Kulo 
System did in 1986. In the comparison of management in agency-built systems where farmer 
cooperation is low relative to that of locally managed systems the difference in time given to 
each for achieving its observed status is seldom considered. The question, however, is not 
how long to wait for farmers to realize that they need to cooperate with each other and agency 
staff, but what can be done to facilitate and accelerate this process to achieve effective use of 
the irrigation system. 
CONSTRUCTION  AS  A  CAPACITY-BUILDING  EXERCISE  FOR 
LOCAL MANAGEMENT 
In  many  countries.  irrigation  departments  are.  highly  effective design  and  construction 
agencies. Massive investment in new construction in the past few decades mandated devel- 
opment of this capacity. Given the task of developing or improving irrigation systems, the 
emphasis tends to be on producing a high quality irrigation infrastructure. Concern for future 
operation and maintenance of the irrigation works tends to be deferred. 
The proposition here is that this emphasis be reversed. Developing capacity for future 
management should be made the central issue and construction should become the instrument 
for  achieving this  goal. This requires radical changes in  the way  most  assistance and 
improvement projects are implemented. 
This does not call for dismantling irrigation.agencies. Design and construction capacity 
will be needed for new projects in the future. Operation and maintenance must also continue 
on systems that are not turned over to users for management. What is needed is a section within 
agencies that specializes  in providing support services for locally managed systems including 
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Construction as  Management Training 
Locallymanagedsystems haveevolvedinmanydifferentways.Clearly,notallusersoflocally 
managed systems have gone through the process of  constructing their own system or even 
necessarily had much responsibility for making physical improvements. Construction expe- 
rience is not a prerequisite for irrigators to be able to develop rules or identify ways to govern 
their system. However, a physical improvement project, perceived as essential by irrigators, 
may provide the necessary incentive for getting irrigators involved in group decision making 
and rule formation for them to successfully continue the management of  their irrigation 
facilities. 
Irrigators with little previous experience in working together find learning to make and 
implement decisions slow and tedious. They need a viable objective such as implementation 
of  a construction  activity on  which  to focus their effort. Other incentives may  also be 
important. A policy that allows irrigation service fees to be used locally may be one. In many 
cases, it is the opportunity to access a substantial  grant from the agency that provides the most 
important incentive for irrigators to overcome differences and agree to work together. 
Frequently, agency staff assume that farmers do not have the capacity to invest their own 
resources in making system improvements. However, judging from the large number of 
successful locally built systems, irrigators have been willing to make significant investments 
in the past. Experience, from Nepal (WECSmMI 1990) and the Philippines (Bagadion 1988) 
for example, shows that requiring some investment by  the irrigators has several positive 
effects. First, it helps weed out projects that have such low returns that the irrigators refuse to 
invest their own resources. Second, when irrigators’ own funds are invested they tend to 
monitor the results more closely and hold each other and the agency accountable  forthe  results. 
Considerable opposition to such a policy can be expected where this has not been the custom 
in the past. 
If the capacity to mobilize labor and other resources is initially low, the construction 
activities will need to be phased over a number of years. This presents logistical problems for 
the agency with a fixed planning and budget cycle. Changes may be necessary in the way 
budgets are made  and  accounts kept.  However, evidence is strong that the incremental 
approach, with construction spread over many years, has allowed experience and knowledge 
to be  utilized effectively in successful locally managed systems (Yoder 1986). Spreading 
construction over a longer period gives more time for rules to be made, tested, and reformu- 
lated in the ongoing process of institution building. By making improvements  in incremental 
steps there is opportunity to build confidence and improve local investment. 
A legitimate concern in turning over construction to farmers is that they do not have the 
necessary technical expertise to control quality. It would be impossible, even undesirable 
because of  cost, to encourage and train farmers to become skilled construction workers. 
Contracts and other arrangements  will undoubtedly be necessary to arrange for skilled workers 
and specialized equipment. Involving farmers in managing contracts may be inefficient  in the 
short term but ther5are benefits as well. Irrigators do a good job of monitoring the quality and 
quantity of resource use (Korten 1988).  Involvement gives the irrigators  a better understanding 
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preparation for operation and maintenance of the system. Information flow is facilitated which 
reduces the level of suspicion and complaints from fanners and increases their cooperation. 
Management training programs for irrigators should avoid two extreme attitudes. On the 
one hand, there is sometimes a tendency to develop a working procedure through pilot projects, 
then attempt to replicate the results widely without modification. The opposite extreme is to 
assume that systems are so unique that they must all find their own solutions by trial and error. 
The middle way is to allow each group to make its own decisions, but to give each of them 
access to the accumulated experience of  similar irrigation systems in the area. One way of 
doing this is to provide opportunities for farmer-to-farmer training visits that expose irrigators 
to the issues other groups have dealt with and the solutions they have found useful (N. Pradhan 
and Yoder 1989). 
When  irrigators from locally  managed  systems request  agency  assistance they  are 
generally interested in building durable structures to replace the temporary ones that they 
struggle to maintain. There is seldom a request for assistance for improving management 
capacity. However, poorly maintained facilities  may be a symptom of a management problem. 
Problems such as difficulty in accessing declining forest supplies or labor shortage during the 
critical  season when  maintenance is  required are easily identified. Problems related  to 
leadership or lack of rules and sanctions regarding sharing of the work load are not likely to 
be mentioned by irrigators. Careful diagnostic analysis is required to determine the causes of 
problems. Understanding the causes is essential for determining the type and level of support 
the irrigators will need to implement construction. The support staff will need both technical 
and management skills and significant field experience. 
In many cases where systems are proposed forturnover from agency to local management, 
improvements are necessary in  the physical  works before the irrigators will operate and 
maintain the system. Often this need arises less because the irrigators could not make the 
improvements themselves than because of their attitude that it is the agency’s duty to assist 
in putting the system into good working order before they will accept responsibility for it. The 
same is true where transfers of management responsibility are proposed. 
There may be little previous experience with construction, and the complexity of struc- 
tures to be built can vary greatly. Agency staff with management experience may need to 
outline the steps necessary for implementing construction. At each step an may  of options 
should be presented and the irrigators required to process and decide among themselves on 
the approach that they will take to implement the work. 
It is the multitude of peripheral activities -  calling meetings, identifying all irrigation 
users, deciding  how  to  appoint persons to fill responsible roles  and how  to hold  them 
accountable for their actions, deciding what is needed in writing, enforcing penalties for not 
following rules, etc. -  that provide the management training opportunity. Support staff must 
be rewarded for their effort in management training if they are to continue to be  motivated. 
Evaluation of  periodic staff  promotion must  be revised  to include their performance in 
strengthening the less visible organizational and institutional changes as opposed to only the 
traditional measures of structures built and the budget spent. CHAFTER 3 
Water Acquisition 
INTRODUCTION 
WATERACQUI~~TIONF~R  irrigation refers to gaining access and control over water from natural 
sources for distribution to the users of the irrigation system. It is a system-level activity that 
ranges from simple to complex, depending on the nature of the source and the competition 
from others wanting to use the same water. Local rules may regulate acquisition but often 
local rules are supported by a national legal system. 
Rivers  and 'streams  are common  sources of  water for locally managed systems. A 
run-of-the-river  system does not have intervening storage and the  supply is either used 
immediately or lost downstream. The river may be regulated with one or more dams that create 
reservoirs to store water. Storage allows water to be saved for use at a later time, for example, 
from night to day thus avoiding night irrigation, or from one season to the next allowing 
irrigation when it is otherwise too dry. Groundwater, though often more expensive than 
surface water on a per unit basis, is increasingly being tapped for irrigation by local groups 
when other reliable irrigation options are not available. In most cases, tubewells tap directly 
into a groundwater reservoir and deliver water whenever necessary. 
Operation of the pump, lifting water from a surface or groundwater reservoir, controls 
the irrigation supply entering the distribution system. Gravity river diversions need a structure 
to limit the amount of water that enters the canal. Some fanner-built systems simply allow 
excess water to  enter anfl overtop the canal as acontrol mechanism. Others build a fixed orifice 
that restricts excess amounts from entering. Most engineer-designed and some locally built 
gravity systems use adjustable gates to control water entering the system. These control 
structures are  the intake to the main system. 
In some countries, water rights to a source are spelled out in great detail. In others, local 
rules are applied which are largely invisible to an outsider and the delicate balance among 
systems can easily be  upset when a new technology for acquiring water is introduced by one 
or several systems. This chapter describes several examples where locally managed systems 
have developed complex relationships for sharing the water in a river basic. These relation- 
ships govern their water acquisition. 
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WATER  ACQUISlTION 
Water rights that determine the rules for sharing of water among competing users and uses 
constiNte an ancient problem that is increasing as water sources, including groundwater, 
become fully appropriated. The topic is much too broad to be covered in this paper except 
simply to highlight its importance. 
Many governments retain ownership rights to water resources and allow individuals and 
groups of users the right to use the resource. When government agencies with the mandate to 
expand irrigated agriculNre have not recognized the existence and rights of locally managed 
systems, there have fFequently been conflicts. In a case in the Philippines described by Siy 
(1987), the locally managed Zanjera systems were strong enough to demand the redesign of 
a project to accommodate their prior rights. Ambler (1991) describes a case where the 
downstream users, though established first. were not strong enough to influence agency 
intervention upstream that disrupted their traditional irrigation supply. 
Many locally managed irrigation systems have struggled to obtain and maintain theirright 
to use  a source of water. In the process, rules in many different configurations  have evolved. 
In  some locations there is  strict adherence to  riparian  water rights where the landowner 
adjacent to a water source has the right to use it for irrigation. In others, prior appropriation 
is the dominant rule where the first to develop and use the water has the right to continue to 
use it regardless of where it is used. Many modifications and combinations  of these doctrines 
are found in use  today. The following examples illustrate only a few. 
Right of Access to the Water Source 
Huerta of  Valencia. The word huertas refers to intensively irrigated areas that surround or 
adjoin the towns in Spain. The fields surrounding Valencia have been intensively cultivated 
since the Middle Ages. Many of  the institutions governing Valencian irrigation have their 
origins in that period. Eight principal canals serve the huerta with an irrigated area in the order 
of  10,500 ha. Many of the farms are less than 0.5 ha, each, in size; over 99 percent are less 
than 5 ha, each. Perhaps the most important institution linked to the success of irrigation in 
Valencia relates to the rules allocating the river water among the canals. The river water is 
allocated among systems in relation to the needs of each canal -  for irrigation, water-powered 
mills, and certain urban uses in  Valencia.  The allocation among canals appears to have 
remained constant for many centuries (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
There is an intimate relationship among the canals in their acquisition of water. The rules 
governing access by each system change depending upon the supply available in the river. 
When water is abundant monitoring is not necessary and each system can take all that it needs. 
When the committee of  syndics (elected officers of each system) initiates the regime for 
ordinary low water, each canal is allowed to abstract only its assigned share from the river. 
This  is accomplished by  adjusting the  gates  of  the  diversion structures to  divelt fixed 
proportions of  the river flow. The syndics of  the  three  lower canals are responsible for CHAPTER3  21 
measuring the river discharge. They proceed to each intake and together with the syndic of 
that canal adjust the gate to deliver the allocated share of the river water. 
In periods of extraordinary drought, several additional steps are taken. Diversion of water 
from the river below the first canal is rotated with those on the right bank taking water for two 
days and then canals on the left bank taking water for two days. The second action relates to 
several canals upstream of the huerta of Valencia which developed and expanded after those 
in Valencia. By agreement that stems from the time of their formation, they must close their 
diversion canals for four days out of  eight when requested by  the Valencian syndics. In 
addition, the uppermost of the eight canals must give up one-quarter or one-half of its supply 
on Monday and Tuesday each week depending on the severity of the drought. Although the 
eight canal systems assign guards to close headgates and monitor compliance to the river 
rotation, the national government’s water master has at times had to settle claims of down- 
stream and upstream interests concerning the sharing of the river water (Maass and Anderson 
1978). 
River basins in Indonesia. Locally managed systems in a river basin usually have long-estab- 
lished arrangements  for sharing water among systems during dry periods. Lower systems may 
depend on controlled leakage past a series of  diversions. Building a permanent diversion 
structure must take this into account. Bellekens (1992) described how farmers modified the 
flush gate of a government-built weir in Bali, Indonesia, to allow proportional sharing of the 
river. They raised the gate to its fully open position and built a sill in the gate to the same 
elevation as the canal intake. Then they inserted a side wall in the gate to adjust the opening 
to allow proportional discharge division between the canal and downstream users that could 
be  easily checked. 
Ambler (1991) describes a river basin in West Sumatra, Indonesia, where there are over 
60  locally built diversion structures along the length of the river. The purpose of the diversion 
weir is to divide the water in the river so that part of  it flows into the canal and part of it 
continues past the weir to lower systems during the dry season. Formerly, local custom forbade 
putting the weir all the way across this river, to ensure dry-season flows to lower canals along 
the river. The government chose to upgrade some of the traditional weirs that were considered 
to be “leaky.” There was a conceptual problem with this perception as it did not fully take into 
account the fact that water supply during the rainy season was not a real issue, i.e.. that leaks 
do not matter when there is plenty of water, and that intersystem issues were important during 
the dry season -  leaks in upstream weirs constituted automatic supply for lower weirs. 
Upgrading certain canals along the river exacerbated intersystem difficulties. 
Systems in the hills ofNepal. The first article of  the constitution of  the Raj Kulo Irrigation 
System at Argali states that no one is permitted to construct a diversion in the stream within 
90  meters@)  upstream of their diversion (Martin 1986). Such NI~S are typical in many of 
Nepal’s hill systems. Farmers have the right to divert all of the water from the stream at the 
point of their diversion but are not allowed to move the diversion downstream to capture a 
lower spring if  another system is already using that water. New diversions are not allowed 
within a specific distance upstream. Local rules have frequently been contested in court and 
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The diversion of the Tallo Kulo at Chherlung, which runs below but parallel to the Thulo 
Kulo, was destroyed by a landslide and could not be repaired using local materials despite 
many attempts. Eventually, the Tallo Kulo farmers negotiated with another system to use their 
diversion. In return, the Tallo Kulo farmers agreed to improve and maintain the canal and 
diversion and share half of  the water. The Tallo Kulo was only allowed to take its share at 
night until it was proven that the irrigation supply was adequate for the old system to practice 
continuous distribution with half the discharge. 
Mutual canal companies in the Poudre  Valley, Colorado, USA. The Colorado Water Law 
states that “he who develops a water source first in time, retains his right [to use the water] ad 
infinitum,  as long as the water is put  to beneficial  use” (Early  1990). The state retains 
ownership of the water and a water right is only entitlement to its use. The use right is a form 
of property that can be bought, sold, inherited, or leased temporarily. F’rivate individuals as 
well  as  private  not-for-profit corporations can  hold  water  rights  and  provide  water  to 
shareholders in proportion to their investments in the corporation. Within the corporation, 
equity of water access is determined by the corporation’s own rules, usually according to the 
shares owned by the member. Among mutual companies, however, water rights are based on 
the seniority determined by the date of each filed claim to the water. In the State of Colorado, 
administration of water is highly legalized. Courts of law are used to file water rights, settle 
disputes, redress grievances, and assign penalties for damages caused by one party to another. 
Water Rights in Assistance, Turnover and Management Transfer Programs 
Bellekens’  (1992) example from Bali was  drawn from an assistance project for locally 
managed systems. He concludes that 
...  in building diversion structures on mountain stream, it is critical to consider the 
pre-existing water rights among the diflerent irrigation systems using waferfrom  the 
stream. A water-tight diversion generally does not have appropriate provision for 
equitable watersharing. Equitable in this case refers to traditional water rights which 
are  usually related to many  historical factors andfrequently do not  imply equal 
access to water. The irrigators’ preference is for a method that will remain opera- 
tional and reasonably accurate in dividingflows underfluctuating stream conditions. 
Assistance projects must examine outstanding conflicts among systems before providing 
resources for improvement. Agency involvement tends to legitimize the rights of the system 
being  assisted and  may  preclude movement toward  amicable intersystem settlement. If 
improvement work is delayed until binding agreement is reached there will be pressure to 
negotiate. That pressure is lost after the work starts. 
Security of the water right is an important factor in promoting management transfer and 
turnover programs. If there are continuing disputes over the right to access water or if junior CHAPTER  3  23 
status deprives a part of the system of  water during periods of shortage there will be reluctance 
to take over operation and maintenance duties. Martin (1986) states: 
To provide incentive for investments to develop irrigation facilities, the system of 
[water] rights must provide some measure of security that the investors will be able 
to capture all, or at least a significant portion, of the benefits of the invesfment. CHAF'TER  4 
Irrigation Allocation Rules 
INTRODUCTION 
IRRIGATION WATER  IS  normally acquired from a concentrated source and spread by  some 
predetennined irrigation plan over the system's command area. From its origin in a river or 
reservoir, the flow is divided into smaller units until the rate of discharge is appropriate for 
field application. In this paper, the activities associated with the physical movement of  water 
through the conveyance system are referred to as irrigation distribution.  Irrigation distribution 
refers to how the irrigation plan is accomplished, i.e., by continuous distribution or by timed 
rotation, etc. The predetermined plan with its associated criteria and conditions, i.e., the rules 
that determine how the water in the system is to be apportioned in time and space, is irrigation 
allocation. 
The task of  irrigation allocation is to establish a set of  rules that determine and control 
access to the irrigation resource. The examples of different systems given below show wide 
diversity in these rules. In some cases, the allocation rules include definition of the boundaries 
of the irrigation system -  which fields or which individuals have access to the irrigation 
supply -  in effect, identifying within-system water rights (Coward 1990). In many cases, the 
rules determine the geographical and temporal distribution of the water. The rules may simply 
define the order for moving the irrigation supply among distributary canals and irrigators. In 
some systems, the rules include explicit quantification of  the withdrawal allowed from the 
main  canal by  a branch canal or  by  an  individual irrigator from the branch canal. The 
quantification may  be volumetric or,  as is more often the case in locally built systems, a 
percentage of the total discharge determined at some designated location according to some 
specified basis. The bases for allocating the irrigation supply are also diverse. 
Allocation Based on Shares 
The allocation basis may be  the irrigator's  (or his ancestors') investment in the original 
construction of the system or it may be related to the size of  landholding. In some systems, 
the rules state that each canal's or individual's share of  the irrigation supply be computed 
based on a proportion defined as the ratio of individual to total investment or landholding. In 
the development ofpanipanchnynr(watercounci1)  systems in Maharashtra,  India, each family 
is allocated an equal share of the irrigation supply regardless of landholding. Order (in time) 
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of appropriation, household size. productivity of land and value of  property owned in the 
command area have also been used as the bases for allocating the irrigation supply. The basis 
for allocation may be the relative location of the irrigator’s field. For example, the rules used 
may allow irrigation sequentially from the head to the tail of the system. 
Different allocation rules and bases for computing shares may be  used in the same system 
in different seasons if the crop grown or available water supply is different. The rules may 
even change within one crop season depending upon the variability of  the irrigation supply. 
In some systems, adjustment in allocation among irrigators is made to accommodate different 
infiltration  rates. In terraced fields irrigating rice, the allocation to lower terraces may be 
reduced because they benefit from both surface leakage and groundwater infiltrated from 
higher elevation fields. 
Irrigation allocation rules in locally managed systems continue to evolve to best serve the 
needs of the irrigators as market prices, available resources, and technology enable different 
cropping  patterns. Changes are also made to protect access to a limited resource as competition 
for the use of the irrigation supply changes. In examination of  the irrigation allocation rules 
of 18 farmer-managed irrigation systems in the hills of Nepal, none were found to be identical 
in all respects (Martin 1986). Most had rules defining the right of access to the system though 
several did not. Most used the size of family landholding as the basis for sharing the irrigation 
supply; however, several used investment rather than landholding, allowing landless persons 
to own shares of the irrigation supply. All had uniquely different auxiliary rules that modified 
the way drought conditions, winter and spring crops, junior rights, etc.. were handled to tit 
the site-specific  characteristics of each system. 
Allocation Assumed by Design Parameters 
Water  duty of the proposed area to be irrigated was used by engineers in the past to design 
canal capacity. Water duty is simply defined as the amount of water to be diverted from a 
source to irrigate a particular crop sufficiently to produce an economic yield. For example, a 
water duty of  1 to 1.5 liters per second per hectare (Vsedha) flowing continuously was typical 
for designing systems for growing rice  in parts  of  Asia. In  the United  States, the  term 
consumptive  water  use came into use in the twentieth century to describe the water require- 
ments of a crop. Consumptive water use, as well as the term water duty, refers to the amount 
of irrigation required to meet peak evapotranspiration requirements for a crop. 
In  many  developing countries. new  irrigation construction is  the  responsibility of  a 
designated agency that also establishes the allocation rules. The implied rule is often that water 
will be delivered to the entire area designated during design in  accordance with the design 
water duty. This provides little opportunity for farmers to influence the rules to best meet their 
crop requirements and reduces the farmer’s flexibility in managing his irrigation water(Jensen 
1990). Perhaps the simplicity of the implied allocation rules in some agency-managed systems 
is the reason that they are not explicitly stated. 
However, there are examples where complex allocation rules are initiated by  irrigation 
agencies. Indonesia, for example, has a number of distinct allocation methods with rules that CHAPTER  4  27 
are designed to match observed hydrologic and meteorological trends with field conditions. 
Several examples are given below of allocation rules operating in agency-managed systems. 
Irrigation Scheduling as the Basis for Allocation 
In the past few decades, a great deal of research was undertaken to characterize the crop 
response to varied inputs of water. The results, widely known as crop productionfunctions, 
are used in defining the marginal crop production required in the computation of the maximum 
profit for  management and  economic  analysis (Howell et  al.  1990). The  uses  of  crop 
production functions are often criticized because they are empirically derived, site-specific, 
and cannot appropriately reflect other inputs such as climate, crop nutrients, soil salinity, pest 
infestations, etc. However, work  in  defining crop production functions and  subsequent 
research did identify that water stress in different growth stages of plants has different effects 
on  harvestable yield. 
In principle, it is possible to plan an irrigation program on the basis of information from 
monitoring the  soil  water,  the  state of  water  in  the plant, and/or  the microclimate. In 
water-scarce environments, the ability to determine when to irrigate and the precise amount 
to apply at each irrigation and during each stage of plant growth allows optimization of water 
use, provided, of course, that sufficient precision in irrigation delivery is possible. 
Irrigation scheduling is the term used to describe when and how much water to apply or 
to determine when to start and when to stop irrigation application. In irrigation systems with 
sufficient control and flexibility in the delivery system, irrigation scheduling has become the 
basis for irrigation allocation. This requires the ability to arrange the irrigation delivery on 
demand where individual irrigators determine their irrigation requirement and  access the 
supply. In  a true demand system there is little communication necessary with the irrigation 
supplier. The system automatically adjusts to the increased withdrawal. In  many systems 
where irrigation scheduling is used, it is necessary for the irrigator to request an arranged 
delivery by  ordering the irrigation some period in advance as determined by the allocation 
rules (Burt and Plusquellec 1990). 
While a great deal of the research reported in the professional literature on irrigation in 
the past decade deals with  irrigation scheduling, there has been much less work done on 
investigating irrigation allocation rules appropriate to accommodation of scheduling. 
EXAMPLW OF IRRIGATION ALLOCATION RULES 
Locally Managed Systems 
Subak Gunung Mekm Menusari, Bali, Indonesia.  After the construction of the diversion and 
canal in 1979, water in excess of domestic needs was allocated to the sub& members. Since 28  CHAFTER 4 
all members had contributed equally to the work each received an equal share. The total supply 
at the diversion was divided into 74  shares. One share was allocated to the communal land of 
the village near the diversion, two shares to the communal land of Bunutin Village where 
subak members are resident, one share to the subak head, and one share for each of the 70 
subak members (Pitana 1991). 
The irrigation distribution was made continuous to all shareholders.  Though the discharge 
was low this allowed water for domestic purposes to be available in all parts of the village at 
all times. The allocation rule agreed upon by the suhak members called for equal shares for 
each person who assisted with construction. The simplest procedure for accomplishing this 
was to proportionally divide the canal discharge at each canal branch and fanner’s field. 
However, fanners in the lower end of the system did not agree that this method was equitable. 
Two subsequent changes were made in the distribution procedures (see Chapter 5)  to ensure 
equal irrigation supply at the inlet of each fanner’s field. 
Raj Kulo in Argali, Palpa, Nepal. Prior to the twentieth century, only rice was irrigated by 
the Raj Kulo System. Soon after the turn of the century maize was added to the cropping cycle 
and in the  1950s wheat became the third crop irrigated annually in the same fields. The 
irrigation allocation rules used are typical of many farmer-managed irrigation systems in the 
hills of Nepal. Rice remains the dominant crop and the imgation allocation rules for rice are 
used to demarcate the boundaries of the system and membership in the organization of users. 
The charter of authority rests with irrigators owning land entitled to receive water for growing 
rice. 
Each  field entitled to imgate rice is  designated. Field size is used  as  the basis for 
computing the fraction of the total canal discharge in the system to be delivered to each field. 
This is equal to the ratio of the field area to the total area irrigated by the system (Martin 1986). 
Thus the irrigation supply for each field is quantified relative to the total supply reaching the 
command area. The rules for irrigation allocation do not make adjustment for differences in 
soils or seepage losses from the canal between the head and tail of the system. 
By  designating the fields allowed to receive irrigation, the system has defined the 
boundaries of the irrigated area for monsoon rice and has clearly identified who are included 
and excluded as members of the system. More than double the area growing rice is commanded 
by the canal hut owners of those fields cannot be members of the Raj Kulo System unless they 
also own fields to which water has been allocated. Drainage water from the system is used by 
several to grow rice in fields outside the defined command hut they have no claim to water 
from the system if none is diverted to the drain. Irrigators using drainage water are prohibited 
from participating in system maintenance during the rice season to prevent them from laying 
claim to part of the supply. 
After the rice harvest, the allocation rules are changed for irrigating wheat in the winter 
and maize in the spring. In these two Seasons of the year, any field commanded by the canal 
can be irrigated and the irrigated area nearly doubles during the seasons in which maize and 
wheat are grown. As soon as rice seedbeds are established at the onset of the rainy season, the 
allocation rules revert to those established for growing rice (Martin 1986). CHAFTER  4  29 
Thulo Kulo in Chherlung, Palpo. Nepal. The Thulo Kulo was constructed in the late 1920s 
by the collective investment of 27 families of the Chherlung community. They agreed before 
starting work that the irrigation supply would be shared in proportion to the investment made 
by all contributors. By the time the first water was delivered, the investment totaled 5,000 
Nepali rupees (Mls).  This was divided into 50 shares with a value of NRs 100 each. Initially, 
the capacity of the canal limited water delivery and only a small area could be irrigated by 
each household. After continuing to improve the canal for a few years, two families had more 
than sufficient water to grow rice in all their fields but others with fewer shares still required 
more water. Also other families in the community who had not contributed to the construction 
were now keen to purchase shares of water. 
This led to the establishment of a water market. The committee elected by  those who 
owned shares established the price, which included the cost of initial construction and the cost 
of  subsequent canal maintenance and improvement. Individuals interested in purchasing a 
share made private arrangements with a person willing to sell excess shares.  The price actually 
paid was not always disclosed. Most transactions were a fraction of a share. A treasurer was 
elected by the shareholders to record change in share ownership for both the buyers and sellers 
in order to arrange irrigation distribution. The two founders  of the system who had contributed 
most of the funds by borrowing money were easily able to sell their excess shares and recover 
much of their investment. 
In 1978, a group of farmers with uninigated land in the Thulo Kulo command wanted to 
purchase water but no individual was prepared to sell the number of shares the fanners needed. 
The Thulo Kulo organization determined that by improving the diversion weir and canal the 
discharge could be  increased. A decision was made to sell ten additional shares, i.e., increasing 
the total number of shares in the system from 50 to 60.  Those purchasing the new shares paid 
the Thulo Kulo organization rather than an individual for their shares and the money was used 
to improve the diversion and main canal. This endeavor successfully brought enough addi- 
tional water to expand the command area by 25 percent in one year (Martin and Yoder 1987). 
Different allocation rules are used in the dry season when the water supply in the source 
is low. The first rule relates to the type of crop that can be grown. Though rice is the preferred 
crop, the irrigation supply is not sufficient and the irrigation supply is all allocated to a 
less-water-intensive crop such as maize. Even with the entire discharge of the stream diverted 
into the canal there is only enough water to irrigate a few maize fields at a time. Instead of 
using the share system of allocation, full authority for allocation during this period -  both in 
terms of  delivery and quantity -  is given to the elected system leader. All requests for 
irrigation must be  made to him  and, as nearly  as possible and practical, considering the 
efficiency of moving the supply among canals, he assigns water delivery to each irrigator’s 
field in the order in which requests are received. A field usually consists of several terraces 
depending on the slope and size. In order to allow equity in timely planting of every fanner’s 
maize, the leader decides, on the basis of requests for water each day, what portion of each 
farmer’s field, i.e., how  many terraces, will be inigated in his turn. In this way, water is 
allocated by  turn to fanners, and a portion of their land is inigated. A farmer must then wait 
for another one or more turns to complete his maize planting. 30  CHAFIER 4 
Thambesi Kulo, Nawulparasi, Nepal. Not all fanner-managed irrigation systems have defined 
their irrigation allocation as explicitly as those described in the preceding three examples. A 
system in this category in the hill part of Nawalparasi District in Nepal was studied intensively 
for 18 months in 1981-82. (Yoder 1986, Martin 1986). 
As  reported  by  the 70-year-old former  system leader, the system is more than  six 
generations old. A small stream is diverted onto a large river terrace to irrigate 23 ha out of  a 
potential command area of 210 ha. The system is used primarily for supplemental irrigation 
for rainy season rice. Winter wheat is irrigated on part of the command area and about one 
hectare of  rice is irrigated next to the diversion in the dry season. Except during the rainy 
season when the entire command area is cropped, most of the land is fallow and is used for 
grazing. 
The system is severely waterconstrained. The stream diverted for irrigation has a small 
catchment and a low base flow between rainfall events. However, diverting the stream into 
the delivery canal is easy. Conveying the water from the diversion to the upper end of  the 
command area only 100 m away is equally easy compared to other hill irrigation systems. 
One person working alone can maintain the diversion and conveyance works with several 
weeks of work in a year. The only serious problem in  system maintenance is control of 
sediment that enters the system. Several fields have been damaged by deposits of gravel that 
had entered the canal. 
Though the Thambesi Kulo is in a similar environment to the Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo 
described above, the farmers using the canal do not have clearly defined rules for irrigation 
allocation. They do not allocate irrigation to individual fields or persons. They keep no written 
records and have seldom held meetings to discuss operation and maintenance of the system, 
The rules used were deduced by observing and mapping the irrigation distribution and from 
the description of system expansion. Fields have priority for irrigation delivery based on their 
location. The upper area is entitled to receive irrigation at all times and in the lower block of 
fields the uppermost field received water first. Trial and error have enabled farmers in the tail 
reach to determine where irrigation will generally be sufficient and the point beyond which 
planting irrigated crops is not useful. 
Siran Tar Kulo, Nepal. The Siran Tar Kulo Irrigation System described briefly in Chapter 2 
is another example where irrieation allocation was not clearly defined by  the farmers who 
built the system. Since an agreement was not made before the construction work began on 
how the irrigation supply would be shared among those who contributed to the construction, 
the fanners at the head of the command area were able to capture all of the limited irrigation 
that was delivered. 
The government project that provided resources and supervision to improve the canal 
assisted the farmers in  determining how they could best allocate their irrigation resources 
among the users. This was done by taking a number of  fanners from the system on a tour to 
other irrigation systems including the Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo described above. After 
discussing irrigation allocation with farmers in numerous systems, the Siran Tar Kulo farmers 
agreed among themselves to allocate irrigation shares on the basis of  landownership. CHAFTER 4  31 
Mutual canal companies in the Poudre Valley, Colorado, USA. Water for irrigation in the 
Poudre Valley comes from four main sources. Run-of-the-river diversions from the Poudre 
River were first developed in the 1850s through the 1870s. From 1880 through 1900 small 
reservoirs were built for storage. At various periods from  1900 through  1960 there was 
intensive groundwater development. In the 1930s, the farmers banded together to lobby for 
construction of the CQloradO  Big Thompson Project (CBT). The CBT was constructed by the 
US  Bureau  of  Reclamation  to divert water  from the Colorado River Basin  west of  the 
continental divide into the Poudre Valley and the lower South Platte Basin. The CBT includes 
a major storage reservoir. 
Individual fanners did not have the necessary resources to develop river diversion systems 
50  groups of fanners formed “mutual ditch companies” to do this collectively. These are stock 
issuing organizations that operate on a nonprofit basis. Within a mutual company, irrigation 
allocation is based on the holding of water-use shares. Early (1990) describes the process by 
which the board of directors of a mutual company in the Poudre Valley determines how much 
water will be available to each share. 
The collective water rights include the sum of the direct diversionflows, the storage 
water, and the CBT supplemental water. The allocation of this water is generally a 
stepwise, monthly procedure. It takes place incrementally as diversion water is 
availablefrom the river. Storage water is known more certainly before the season.... 
The CBT water is also subject to estimations of availability  from snow melt .... The 
CBT water is a buffer supply to even out the effects  of drought. 
The [mutual] ditch companies seek snow pack readings  from the Soil Conservation 
Services andfrom the Northern [Colorado Water Conservancy]  District as  early as 
January for the irrigation season that begins in April. Monthly snow pack assess- 
ments continue through  April as the runoffbegins and the company board of directors 
begins its monthly allocation of  water on a share basis. The incremental process 
represents the safe, conservative approach to allocation, always allocating only the 
amount of  water  that is assuredly available from direct diversions, from small 
reservoir storage, and from the units of  CBT owned by the company. When excess, 
unappropriated runoff  occurs in the months of April and May, with an early thaw, 
the River Commissioner informs the ditch companies of the availability offree water. 
[Thisfree] ... water isnot chargedtothe wateraccount  oftheshareholderand remains 
free to the opportunistic shareholder who nee&  tofill the root zone forfuture crop 
use or irrigate to promote germination. 
The irrigation company’s secretary keeps an account for each irrigation user. The quantity 
allocated per  share each month from each source is added to the account. Deductions are made 
from the account each time water is delivered. Water is “free” when it can be delivered but 
does not need to be entered into the account. 
The allocation rules of most mutual companies in Northern Colorado include a require- 
ment for uniform delivery of water per share throughout the command area. The losses due 
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sources before allocations are made to the shareholders. In some companies, however, the 
quantity per share is different in parts of a system. This variation is based on expected return 
flows that are traditionally available to those areas. 
The Poudre Valley imgation community has a well-developed water rental market. This 
is in response to continuing small imbalances of water supply among farmers. These are 
caused by changes in the irrigated area, new cropping patterns, development of  wells for 
imgation, development of  additional land for irrigation. etc. To help adjust the resulting 
deficiencies and excesses, water rentals are used. 
Under the strict appropriation doctrine, water is attached to the land for which it was 
originally appropriated. Since water rights from the various sources are owned by the mutual 
companies and not by individuals, the interpretation of the appropriation doctrine in Colorado 
is that water is attached to the company’s service area as a whole and not to a specific farm. 
Thus water users own shares in the company rather than water rights. Water dividends or 
allotments are declared by the company on the basis of share ownership rather than on land 
owned in the service area. These shares -  and the water allotments -  are treated as personal 
property that can be bought, sold, or rented for a season or a shorter period. Normally, rental 
is only within the service area of the company (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
The larger mutual companies maintain a rental service in the company office. A share- 
holder who has excess water lists it with the secretary and those needing additional water 
contact the secretary to obtain it. In some companies, the price is fixed by the board of directors 
and all transactions take place at the established price. Other companies allow shareholders 
to post the quantity of water they have available and their asking price. Users needing water 
take the lowest price posted or bargain for lowerprices. In times of drought, the shares offered 
for rent are quickly taken and the price rises. Farmers with low value crops such as forage 
may find it more profitable to rent their water to a user with a high-value crop. The rental 
market. while dealing with a relatively small amount of water, makes better adjustment of the 
land-water relationship than is found in many irrigated areas of  the western United States 
(Maass and Anderson 1978). 
Huerro ofValencia. The rules for allocating the irrigation supply entering a canal among users 
are nearly identical in all eight canals serving the huerta. They state explicitly that water is 
“married” to the land meaning  that transfers among farmers by  renting and selling are 
prohibited. 
Under periods of ordinary water supply conditions the imgation supply is divided to all 
farms in proportion to the land area of each farm. In periods of extraordinary drought, the 
irrigation supplied to each farm is still basically in proportion to the area of land imgated but 
may be modified by the water requirements of the crops planted. The requirements are defined 
by the farmer subject to the surveillance of canal officers. However, as drought becomes more 
and more extreme, the effective discretion of the individual farmer to define his requirements 
becomes more limited, and ultimately the rule that water is supplied in proportion to land is 
abandoned. When drought is so severe that some crops will be lost the supply is shared in 
proportion to crop needs with orchards and other high-value crops getting preference (Maass 
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Huena ofdlicante. The huerta of Alicante is located on the east of Spain on a small coastal 
plain bordering the Mediterranean and is south of Valencia with a similar climate. The area 
irrigated is about 3.700 ha with over 2,400 farms. Ninety-three percent are less than 5 ha in 
size and the water for irrigation is in short supply. In addition to the Monnegre River originally 
diverted to irrigate the area, irrigation water is brought by a private company from wells over 
70 km away, from the Segura River 50 km away, and from private wells in the command area. 
As in Valencia, fanners in Alicante are affected by water shortages. However, the manner 
in which  the irrigators dealt with abundance and shortage since the thirteenth century is 
different. Alicante has institutions  for transferring water from one farmer to another. The rules 
for irrigation allocation have “divorced” water from land. The right to irrigation in Alicante 
is based on the ownership of water shares, not land. Some shareholders do not own land and 
most fanners do not own sufficient shares to supply their farms. In any period of irrigation 
delivery, a significant number of shareholders do not use the water to which they are entitled, 
but sell it to others (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
When the famous Tibi Dam was built on the Monnep  River in the 16th century, it was 
assumed that the reservoir would double the supply of usable water. Half of this supply. the 
“new water’’ was assigned to all owners of huerta land who had contributed to the construction 
of the structure. The basis used for this distribution was landownership. The “old water” to 
which rights had been acquired before the dam was built, was divided among the old rights 
holders in proportion to the rights that they owned. The “old water”could continue  to betraded 
but a rule was made that it could only be traded among owners of “new water” thereby limiting 
the expansion of the irrigated area and keeping down the price of water. The boundaries of 
the system are still defined according to this rule. 
Agency-Managed Systems 
In reviewing examples of locally managed systems in a range of agro-climatic regions, we 
see that with a few exceptions, successful systems in social, economic, and technical terms 
are those that clearly define irrigation allocation rules. Before exploring the equity and 
efficiency implications  of irrigation allocation for assisting locally managed systems,  the rules 
for two agency-managed systems are presented. These illustrate a dominant goal in many 
agency systems -emphasis  on  efficiency in resource use. This requires responsive manage- 
ment capacity and physical works capable of the level of control necessary. 
Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation System (UPRIIS), the Philippines. The UPRIIS 
is a 100,000-ha reservoir-assisted canal system located in the central plain of Luzon. It is 
divided into four districts of approximately equal size which are in turn divided into smaller 
units. Many of the UPRIIS subsystems were originally constructed and operated as inde- 
pendent run-of-the-river systems. Beginning in early 1970, these systems were rehabilitated 
and incorporated into LJF’RIIS  as a part of the reservoir-construction project. A double crop 
of rice is the typical cropping pattern of the part of the system studied by Ferguson (1992). 
The rainy season extends from mid-June through September  and about 70 percent of the 1,800 34  CHAPTER  4 
mm annual rainfall occurs during this period. Rainy season irrigation is supplemental to the 
rainfall and the dry-season crop is almost entirely dependent upon irrigation. 
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) constructed UPRIIS and is responsible for 
all main system management. Ferguson (1992) described NIA’s irrigation allocation activi- 
ties. The determination of irrigation allocation begins 1-2 months prior to the first seasonal 
deliveries with the preparation of an operations plan. This consists of an estimation of the total 
irrigable area targeted for cultivation and theexpected cropping pattern. Typically,  the UPRIIS 
central office programs all irrigable acreage for rainy season cultivation. For the dry season 
they use a storage volume curve to determine the likely supply available from storage. The 
rule used specifies the amount of area to be cropped as a function of preseason (31 October) 
reservoir water surface elevation. 
Based on  equity, availability of  captured  drainage, proximity  to  the  water source, 
topography and soils, the total UF’RIIS  programmed area is first allocated to the four districts, 
then to distinct subsystems down to the level of smaller distributary canals. The NIA does not 
formally program individual farms; afarmer’s ability to grow crops depends on gaining access 
to irrigation deliveries, which are  directed toward the programmed area (Valera 1985). 
Once the seasonal programmed area is determined, operational planning projects weekly 
irrigated areas and water deliveries to district and subdistrict units. Planned weekly deliveries 
are based on the mean water availability (rainfall and streamflow) to the system against the 
estimated average water requirements, conveyance losses and water use efficiency. After the 
season begins, the central UPRIIS office schedules actual  irrigation deliveries from the 
reservoir, on a weekly time frame. Field staff report weekly on estimated area under irrigation, 
rainfall, and irrigation discharge in major channels. These data are recorded by the central 
office, but are not utilized to revise the operations plan. Instead, planned deliveries are adjusted 
in response to complaints and requests for additional water from the districts, sometimes 
accompanied by a brief field inspection of the area. 
Ferguson’s (1992) study showed that though elements of a flexible irrigation allocation 
process were in place, the agency response to changes in predicted supply was not systematic 
and tended to overreact after responding too late. While the fanners of  the system varied the 
use of water by source, season, site characteristics, and the relative scarcity of water, NIA’s 
irrigation allocation plan does not formally consider such spatial and temporal differences. 
The seasonal plan is formulated on the basis of constant average values. Adjustments are made 
in the plan over the season but only respond to actual conditions indirectly via complaints 
from the field. This makes it difficult to efficiently and equitably distribute the irrigation 
supply to the fanners. 
Pasten system  of  irrigation allocation, Java  Indonesia. The pasten  system of  irrigation 
allocation has its origin with the Dutch. The procedures which evolved as modifications were 
made to respond to field conditions found in various parts of the country. Kelley and Johnson 
(1989) describe a modified pasten method of irrigation allocation used in East Java. This is 
the “relative palawija factor” (RPF)  which allocates available irrigation to each tertiary block 
in proportion to the water requirements of the crops in the block. 
Basically,  there  are two types of  decisions in  this  process that  relate to  irrigation 
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the year or season is estimated and appropriate cropping systems are determined to optimize 
use of the anticipated water. This is done by using historical, hydrological, and meteorological 
information for each system. The second part relates to daily operation after the cropping 
pattern is established, to determine quantity and timing of irrigation delivery (IIMI 1987). 
To determine appropriate irrigation delively, the full water requirements for each crop- 
growth stage are estimated using a “relative water requirement” index. These are specific crop 
water needs expressed in terms of previously established requirements for nonrice (palawija) 
crops such as maize and soybean. Rice, for example, is given a relative water requirement of 
4.0 from transplanting through flowering, compared to maize which is by definition 1.0. The 
entire irrigated, cropped area is thus converted into a relative nonrice area. This relative area 
is then multiplied by the “pasten water requirement factor,” a simple water duty. This factor 
is often taken as 0.25 Vsecha but can be varied according to the soil texture. The result is 
multiplied by a distribution system loss coefficient  to determine  the final block-level irrigation 
requirement. 
Irrigation allocation takes place by reconciling the block-level irrigation requirement to 
water availability. To do this, the total system deficit factor is calculated by  dividing the 
discharge available for irrigation in the source by  the sum of  all tertiary block irrigation 
requirements. The supply that can be  allocated to each tertiary block is then  found by 
multiplying the irrigation requirement of that tertiary block by the system deficit factor. Thus 
the total allocation becomes equal to available total supply, and the demand of each tertiary 
block is reduced in the same proportion. 
This allocation procedure is to take place every 10 to 15 days. Theoretically, the revised 
allocation targets are available for every structure and tertiary block at least every two weeks 
allowing efficient matching of  the supply to the demand. 
EQUITY,  EFFICIENCY  AND  ADEQUACY  CONSIDERATIONS  IN 
ALLOCATION RULES 
The examples illustrate that a wide range of  rules are used to allocate irrigation resources 
among  users of a system. The rules are used in some cases to establish boundaries and limit 
access. In agency-managed systems, the goal is often to share the irrigation resource as widely 
as possible and the tendency is to establish rules that emphasize efficiency in water use. 
Locally managed systems tend to emphasize equity and adequacy first. This is especially true 
when the irrigators have invested in constructing the system. 
Locally Managed Systems 
Irrigation allocation rules establish the equity principle  by which members of the system share 
the inigation resource. When the process for determining rules is controlled by the irrigators, 
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defined equity as equal water sharing. The local perception of equity included accounting for 
lossesindelivery. Adjustmentsinirrigationdistributioncontinueduntilthis  was accomplished 
at each irrigator’s inlet. In the Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo systems, however, no adjustment is 
made for the losses due to spills, domestic use,  seepage, or evaporation within the command 
area. Reduced discharge per share due to location is accepted as equitable by their definition. 
Inigators at the end of a long distributary canal in the Raj Kulo do what they can to reduce 
the losses by cleaning or even lining sections. However, they do not have a right to demand 
more water from an upstream member to compensate for losses. The members of the Raj Kulo 
could collectively decide to modify the allocation rule to give “equal water per share” as in 
Suhak Gunung. However, they would first compare the cost of achieving such accuracy with 
the cost of increasing the supply. To overcome problems in irrigation distribution, the Raj 
Kulo enlarged and lined parts of  the main canal leading to the command area. By increasing 
the irrigation supply, even the most disadvantaged member is now able to receive adequate 
water from his share. Where a source is available to augment the supply, such improvements 
are possibly cheaper than the continuous measurements and monitoring necessary to assure 
equal irrigation delivery. 
In the systems of Valencia, the canal communities say that their irrigation allocation rules 
are for the purpose of ensuring that all members enjoy the benefits of irrigation with “equality 
and equity.” They use equality in two separate senses. In one, it refers to the participation of 
landowners in determining the canals’ operating rules where there is absolute equality -  one 
person, one vote. When the term is used to refer to the quantity of water it means proportionate 
equality. The rules guarantee that all fanners will be favored equally when there is sufficient 
water and suffer equally when there is drought. In extreme drought conditions emphasis is 
placed on fixed proportion to the relative needs of crops in the farms and service areas of 
several laterals and canals (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
The absence of rules -  possibly because the system was relatively new and acceptable 
rules had not yet emerged -in the Siran Tar Kulo allowed a few families in the advantaged 
location at the head of the command area to capture the entire irrigation supplied. Lack of 
confidence  that acceptable  rules could be worked out and enforced to ensure equitable benefit 
to all, reduced participation by potential irrigators when assistance was offered by a govern- 
ment agency. 
In the Thambesi Kulo System the allocation rules reflect priority in appropriating  access 
to the water in the stream. Though unequal in division of the resource, it is considered fair by 
the users because they have accepted a “first in time, first in right” rule. By  dividing the 
delivery into rotation units they have attempted to improve the delivery efficiency but have 
retained their equity principle by allowing some part of the uppermost fields with prior rights 
to receive water at all times. Fields within each rotation unit have the right to take all of the 
available irrigation supply by turn from head to tail of the unit. 
While the allocation rules in Thambesi Kulo do not specify that fields or individuals are 
excluded from the system, there is an accepted precedent that identifies the order for taking 
water. Each farmer has the right to determine if  irrigation is adequate in his field before 
allowing delivery to proceed to the next lower field. Farmers with fields that are not able to 
receive a reliable and adequate supply have no recourse but to plant crops on the basis of 
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decide whether they want to plant irrigated crops and risk not receiving irrigation or whether 
they want to plant rain-fed crops. 
Transferable Shares 
The allocation rule in the Thulo Kulo System implies equity on the basis of investment. Maass 
and Anderson (1 978) point out two concerns about equity when the irrigation resource can be 
separated from land as in the Thulo Kulo System. One is speculation, a situation where water 
is purchased with the intent of selling it at a higher price without using it. Alternatively, it is 
possible for individuals with access to capital to capture a larger share of the market, thus 
reducing the efficiency of the system. In the Thulo Kulo System both of these problems are 
avoided by requiring maintenance responsibility in proportion to ownership of water shares. 
Since maintenance costs in the Thulo Kulo increase more rapidly than  gain from adding 
irrigation shares above some minimum level, there is financial incentive for divesting of  all 
but the minimum shares necessary for adequate irrigation by labor-intensive  methods. Since 
a market for short-term allocation has not developed, speculation in irrigation shares is less 
profitable than in other investments, such as land. 
Maass and Anderson (1978) indicate that local regulation of  allocation rules makes it 
possible for irrigators to control behavior adverse to their collective interests. In Alicante, the 
irrigation community has adopted membership and voting criteria that limit the influence of 
the interests that are likely to be most antagonistic: the large holders of old water rights and 
proprietors of  very  small, uneconomic-sized farms. Thus even  without the maintenance 
mechanism as in the Thulo Kulo, Alicantians have control of the water market. Maass and 
Anderson (1978) also conclude that the system in Valencia, where irrigation is allocated 
proportional to land, is no more equitable than the water market in Alicante and is certainly 
not as efficient. 
Martin and Yoder (1987) compared the principle of irrigation allocation based on land 
area in the Raj Kulo System to that of the Thulo Kulo System based on investment. Both 
systems have additional land available for expansion of irrigated rice, the primary crop. Both 
have high maintenance costs that are shared proportionally according to the  allocation of 
irrigation shares. However, expansion of membership in the Raj Kulo. as  defined by the right 
to use irrigation for growing rice, has not been allowed in many decades while the Thulo Kulo 
imgated area has expanded rapidly in response to the market for water shares. 
The concern of Raj Kulo members has been to increase the irrigation discharge per share 
by making improvements in the system. This has allowed them to switch from rotational to 
continuous irrigation distribution to all plots simultaneously. Since the transfer of water is not 
allowed in the Raj Kulo there is no individual financial incentive for irrigators to use their 
water efficiently in order to give up part of their supply so that other farmers can grow rice. 
In the Thulo Kulo there has been rapid expansion in the number of members and in the area 
irrigated. Individuals have a cash-sale incentive that is much higher than the savings from 
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Agency-Managed Systems 
Irrigation allocation in UPRIIS in the Philippines and the pasten method of  allocation in 
Indonesia are practiced in response to the desire to use irrigation resources efficiently. Both 
propose to use localized information about crop water requirements to schedule irrigation 
delivery accurately. Successful delivery according to such an allocation rule will save water 
generally lost by  more uniform application scheduling. The design of the physical structures 
in UPRIIS allows a great deal of flexibility in operating the system. However, accuracy in 
information collection, management of massive flows of data that have validity for only short 
periods, and incorporation of  this information into the decision process with appropriate 
feedback to the field for operation have not been highly successful. 
Ferguson (1992) says that the problem in UF'RIIS is one of not planning for contingencies 
where variability is the norm. Instead, the managers tend to fall back on historical averages. 
Dynamic decision making is needed that uses information from the field to anticipate  problems 
and respond before a crisis develops. This would reduce the biased feedback from irrigators. 
IIMI (1987) reported two major sources of  error in the implementation of the pasten 
irrigation allocation. The first relates to poor field data. Research found that estimation of 
cropped area within a block was often in error. Costly resurveying to determine actual block 
size is necessary to overcome this problem. The second was large discrepancies between 
planned and actual delivery. This is not a fault of the allocation method but rather of managing 
distribution. 
Both of these examples reflect a persistent weakness in the pmess  of irrigation develop- 
ment. Irrigation allocation rules and a basis for allocation are sometimes selected that require 
management responses which cannot be readily achieved in their proposed settings. This leads 
to uncertainty at the farm level. Farmers start using options other than those laid out in the 
allocation plan when their experience  tells them they cannot depend on the plan being fulfilled. 
One option is to make cropping decisions as though the irrigation system did not exist and use 
whatever irrigation is available as a bonus. Another is to lobby heavily for extra irrigation, 
which leads to the biases seen in UPRIIS. 
IMPLICATIONS  OF ALLOCATION  RULES  FOR  ASSISTING 
LOCALLY MANAGED SYSTEMS 
Levine and Coward (1989) conclude that irrigation users perceive a pattern of  irrigation 
allocation as equitable if claims to  water are based on social principles that are accepted as 
fair and right. However, the principle of fair and  right is the ideal and what is acceptable, the 
practical reality, is usually a compromise among the interested parties. Determining the goals 
and patterns of fairness in sharing resources acceptable to irrigators should be the starting 
point of dialogue when irrigators are offered assistance for improving their irrigation system. 
Farmers' views differ on what is fair and acceptable. Sometimes what is acceptable to 
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are not  allowed to work on canal maintenance because of  Hindu concepts of  purity  and 
pollution. This means they cannot fulfill the obligation part of the irrigation allocation rule 
and must instead pay a fine for being absent from work. A low-caste landowner and system 
member raised the issue of discrimination against him in an annual meeting but received little 
support for the changes he suggested. 
Identification of Existing Irrigation Allocation Rules 
Whilethedistribution system is highly visible, therules that control thedistribution are seldom 
articulated by the irrigators. As a consequence, even intensive field studies often do not fully 
describe the rules used under all conditions in a system, though they are usually explicit and 
well-defined by the practices of the users. Inability to identify not only the nature of irrigation 
allocation rules used by  farmers but the basis for defining shares or access under differing 
field conditions for each crop is a serious problem for agency staff supervising assistance 
projects. 
Because the physical structures in many locally managed systems are primitive, there is 
often a bias by outsiders suggesting that a single, simple rule defines irrigation allocation at 
all times and in all situations. For their part, irrigators tend to forget that outsiders do not 
understand the intricacies of  their management system. Intimidated by the higher status of 
officials, they may fail to communicate the details of the rules and procedures they use to 
operate and maintain their system. 
If agency staff start field work with awareness that rules almost certainly exist and develop 
systematic questions about how irrigators respond to different irrigation delivery situations 
that they face each crop season, they can break the ice and begin to identify the rules being 
used. Repeated visits and greater probing during interviews are needed to develop a complete 
picture of the allocation rules. Participatory Rural Appraisal has developed effective tech- 
niques for enabling farmers to express their practices (Chambers 1992). These would be 
appropriate in some situations but care is needed to enable disadvantaged groups to express 
their practices rather than for them to be intimidated. 
If irrigators are given responsibility for implementing the improvements as suggested in 
Chapter 2, they will be able to either adapt the improvements to fit the rules they are using or 
recognize that the rules need modification, or both. While this reduces the need to identify the 
details of  the allocation rules, it increases the opportunity for modifying repressive rules that 
may become even more entrenched by  the legitimizing effect of the assistance project. 
Modification of Allocation Rules 
When government assistance was given to the Raj Kulo in  Nepal in  1982, there was an 
expectation  on the part of the government that maintenance needs would be reduced and water 
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assistance, the fanners agreed that a larger area could be irrigated if the irrigation supply was 
increased. However, no mechanism was in place to monitor the change in supply nor was the 
Raj Kulo organization pressed to change its rules to allow system expansion. After project 
completion it was easy for the farmers to insist that previously they, did not have enough water 
to irrigate properly but now there is just enough. They refused to allow system expansion. If 
the allocation  rules had been understood and negotiations carried out for assistance  contingent 
on modification of  the rules and if potential irrigators had been made a part of the negotiation, 
it is likely that expansion would have taken place (Yoder 1983). 
Assistance projects generally require some input from irrigators in the irrigation improve- 
ment process. Since irrigation allocation rules generally link access to irrigation with respon- 
sibility for operation and maintenance costs there is opportunity to strengthen local institutions 
by utilizing these existing rules. This also affords  an opportunity to examine the rules carefully 
for discrimination of marginal members in the community and to negotiate change. However, 
there must be awareness that possibly a long and largely undocumented history has shaped 
the allocation rules and that change may be strongly resisted. 
Assistance to established irrigation systems requires that projects should work through 
the irrigators’ organization and  within the existing rules.  If  the organization is weak, the 
assistance exercise should be designed to strengthen it. If the organization is strong, there is 
less danger that conditions or practices that do not fit the existing rules will be imposed on 
the organization. 
IMPLICATIONS  OF ALLOCATION  RULES  FOR  MANAGEMENT 
TRANSFER 
Irrigation allocation in agency-managed systems tends to be the exclusive domain of agency 
staff. Fanners in agency systems are seldom involved in the process of data collection, analysis 
and decision making required in systems using scheduling techniques for irrigation allocation 
such as in UPRIIS of  the Philippines or the pasten system in Indonesia. Transferring the 
management of parts of such a system to fanner groups will require intensive organizing and 
training for the group to be able to cany a role in scheduling. Such effort, however, will not 
be warranted unless irrigation delivery in the main system can be assured according to the 
plan. Farmers will not continue collecting data or participating in meetings to give voice to a 
decision unless it is evident that their input is making a difference in the performance of the 
service they receive. This highlights the importance of  effective management at the main 
system level and the value of irrigator involvement in decision making above the parts that 
they manage directly. It also suggests that systems with an adequate and reliable irrigation 
supply are likely to be the best candidates for turnover. 
Management transfer assumes that irrigators will be able to coordinate irrigation distri- 
bution activities with agency staff at a higher hydrologic level within the system than before 
transfer, This is not likely to be possible unless the irrigation allocation rules are functional 
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irrigators should assist in reviewing and, if necessary, modifying the allocation rules that apply 
at all levels in the system. 
IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOCATION RULES FOR TURNOVER 
Many  irrigation systems built and  operated by  agencies do not  have  explicitly defined 
irrigation allocation plans. They expect to operate according to criteria -  water duty or 
estimated crop water requirements -established  during the design process. Information on 
the available irrigation supply and the area that can be served by it was often not reliable during 
the design period. Even after some years of operational experience, with conclusive evidence 
of high deviations from design assumptions, there is seldom a mechanism for modifying the 
irrigation allocation plan. It is unlikely that fanners will agree to take over part or all of  a 
system until functional  allocation  rules are implemented and tested. Since turnover is expected 
to result in local management, participation in the process of  modifying the allocation rules 
is a good management exercise for irrigators. 
Reasonable reliability of the irrigation supply and reduction in maintenance costs are 
frequently high priorities among farmers. As seen in the examples from locally managed 
systems, equability in sharing irrigation benefits and costs is important and usually has higher 
priority than production and efficiency goals. The ability to monitor and verify that irrigation 
delivery matches the allocation is important to irrigators  wheneverthey must pay for operation 
and maintenance. CHAPTER 5 
Irrigation Distribution 
INTRODUCTION 
THE IRRIGATION  DISTRIBUTION  activity involves moving the controlled irrigation supply from 
the intake to the farmers’ fields. Numerous ways have been devised by irrigators in locally 
managed systems to accomplish this task. Operation of the distribution system shifts from one 
mode to another depending on the season and crop being irrigated or even within a season if 
the available irrigation supply changes. 
Different methods of irrigation distribution and the logic for shifting among them  are 
examined in this chapter. While locally managed  systems are not  always successful in 
eliminating conflict, some of the methods and rules used for monitoring distribution have 
potential for application in systems considering management transfer and turnover. 
DISTRIBUTION 
Successful irrigation distribution fulfills objectives reflected in the cropping plan or in the 
rules for allocating the irrigation resource. The following examples illustrate that irrigation 
distribution is another variable in the complex relationship that determines irrigation perform- 
Except under conditions of  an  abundant water supply, some level of monitoring is 
essential to determine whether irrigation distribution is fulfilling the irrigation plan. Monitor- 
ing takes different forms depending on the technology and procedures being used and the 
management level at which information is processed and decisions  made. As a general pattern, 
systems where allocation rules simply divide the irrigation supply proportionally require less 
monitoring than demand-based systems that expect feedback from field conditions to adjust 
irrigation distribution. 
ance. 
Irrigation Distribution in Locally Managed Systems 
Subak  Gunung Mekar Mertasari, Eali, Indonesia. After tapping their first water source and 
successfully building the canal and tunnel, the community’s domestic water supply problems 
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were solved. The remaining water was available for irrigation. Villagers who had worked 
during the entire period of canal construction formed the subak and allocated the irrigation 
supply among themselves with an equal share to each member. 
Irrigation distribution was first made by installing proportional dividers at the bifurcation 
of each canal. The irrigation supply was divided on a proportional basis with the openings in 
the dividers adjusted equally for each subak member. There was no compensation for water 
losses (Pitana 1991). 
Since domestic use, seepage and  evaporation decrease the  available discharge to be 
divided among users in the lower reaches of the canal relative to those in the upper reaches, 
the quantity of water per share was not uniform over the system. As a result, farmers at the 
end of the canal could not grow rice on as large an area as farmers near the source. The subak 
agreed with farmers having fields in the lower reaches of  the canal that this was not  an 
acceptable solution for distributing their scarce resource. 
Frequently. a system using such a distribution method, as will be seen in the Thulo Kulo 
example below, only monitors the proportional dividing structure to see that it is functioning 
properly. In this case, however, farmers compared the utility of  the irrigation supply by 
monitoring the areaof rice land that could he irrigated. It was agreed that farmers in the farthest 
 pa^? of the system were getting less water than those with fields near where the system entered 
the command area. 
In  1980, they changed the openings of  the proportional dividers to accommodate the 
estimated losses in the canal (Pitana 1991). Much  as an engineer would approach such a 
problem, the farmers estimated the seepage and evaporation losses for the varied length of 
each canal, allowed for extraction for domestic use and made systematic adjustments in the 
ratio of openings at each canal bifurcation. 
Though theoretically this method should have been  acceptable to all farmers. it was 
difficult to determine losses. After a month of trial, complaints from fanners, who had given 
up part of their share to augment the shares of those in disadvantaged positions, led the subak 
to again modify the proportional dividers. 
This time they measured the discharge and adjusted for equal delivery to each subak 
member’s field. This involved intensive monitoring of  the discharge using a volumetric 
measure. A two-liter can was used to measure the flow through each member’s outlet. The 
relative discharge was adjusted by  trial and error at each proportional divider until the time 
required to fill every can was equal. At the time of this adjustment the subak concluded that 
a member’s share of  the irrigation supply, given the total supply available at that time, was 
two liters in 36 seconds. This final adjustment was alaborious task thatrequired many repeated 
trials. When all were satisfied that the distribution was equal to all parts of  the system, the 
openings in the proportional dividers were set and further adjustment was not allowed. 
This final adjustment was made during the low flow period when water was most critical. 
When discharge in the system increases, delivery to each field is no longer equal because the 
discharge characteristics of  the canals and dividers change. However, this is not contested 
because the increased irrigation supply makes such differences less important. This level of 
concern for equity in irrigation distribution is not unusual in Bali. Working hard to find an 
acceptable solution for all members reduces the level of conflict and improves participation 
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CentralNepalhillsysterns.’The  method for irrigation distribution in Nepal’s farmer-managed 
systems varies from system to system and within a system depending on the crop being grown 
and the level of available irrigation supply over the growing season. The two main determi- 
nants of the distribution method are the supply of water relative to the farmer’s perception of 
the irrigation demand for the crop, and the water application technique appropriate for the 
crop. Other factors also considered in the  selection of  the distribution technique are the 
absolute supply of water arriving at the command area, the average of the distances between 
farmers’ houses and their fields, and the ability to manage the conflicts that might arise over 
the distribution of irrigation. 
For growing rice, farmers in the hot, low valleys of the central Himalayan hills prefer an 
irrigation supply that allows water to flow continuously in the field canal so that they can 
divert it into their rice field at any  time and in any  quantity. They  conclude from their 
experience that rice grows best when there is a continuous flow of  water into the paddy in 
sufficient quantity to allow some overland drainage to keep the paddy water cool and from 
becoming stagnant. Few systems have water supply conditions allowing them to be operated 
in this manner. 
Most systems are able to start the rice irrigation season with distribution in a continuous 
mode, i.e., flowing in all the canals and into most field inlets simultaneously. Earth and stone 
are the only structures dividing the flow among channels and into fields in some systems 
during this perikd. As the supply diminishes, conflicts arise as each farmer adjusts the stones 
to capture more of  the water in the system for himself. Often, irrigators need to guard the 
turnout to their fields so that other irrigators do not reduce the flow to augment the supply to 
the latter’s own fields. Farmers in the Raj Kulo System of  Argali reported that until they 
improved the supply to the system in the 1960%  there were periods in most years when they 
needed to sleep by their turnouts at night to guard their water. 
Fanners were observed using three techniques to reduce conflicts in irrigation distribu- 
tion.  Under  certain  conditions proportional dividing  structures were  installed  to extend 
continuous distribution. When the irrigation supply diminished and continuous distribution 
was not practical, rotational distribution was used. Some communities have used a totally 
different approach. They had hired one or several persons to manage the distribution without 
assistance from farmers. Examples will be used to illustrate each of these. 
Often, farmers agree that the water supply is adequate to meet the irrigation demand, 
provided that each irrigator takes only his entitled share. Under such conditions the farmers 
of the central region of Nepal have arrived at the same technical solution for distributing water 
equitably as have farmers in many countries? They install a proportional divider in the canal 
2  The inigation disvibution practices reported here wen  observed in the hill region of Nepal’s Western Development 
Region.  Eight system wereintensively monitoredforeighteenmonfhsandmanyothersvisitedperiodically. SeeYoder 
(1986) for a report on the  quantitative analysis of irrigation distribution in three ofthe  system. 
Indigenous proponional divickrs are  reportcd in many lwtions:  Nanhern Pakistan (Dani and Siddiqi 1987). Notihem 
India (Coward  1990). Bhutan (Pmdhan 1989). Sri hka  (Leach 1961). Bali (Gecnz 1980 and Sutawan 1987). South 
Sumatra (Pusat 1984). West  Sumatra  (Ambler 1990). North Sumatra (Singar 1989). the Philippines (Yak  1990). 
Nanhern Thailand (Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong  1983) and  Spain (Maass and Anderson  1978). This list is  far  fmm 
exhaustive. It is expected that with diligent observation one  would find similar devices in most counties  where the 
conditions are appmpriate for effective prnportional division of the irrigation supply. 
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during an  irrigation delivery rotation. Scrips, provisional certificates that are negotiable, 
stating the amount of time the owner can receive water are available at the office. The scrips 
are printed in twelve denominations of delivery time from one hour down to one-third of a 
minute. When it is announced that the next irrigation rotation is about to start, farmers go and 
collect the scrips to represent the shares that they own. A farmer who does not need all of his 
water in the next rotation can sell some of his scrips to  a farmer who needs more water. 
An informal market is conducted principally on Sunday and Thursday mornings. There 
is no posted price or hawking. Huerta men stand amund in small groups and talk in subdued 
voices about the price of water and in the process negotiate sales. The prices paid by a farmer 
for a one-hour script or fraction of one varies over the morning as the supply and demand 
relations develop. 
The irrigation syndicate also owns some water as a means to provide an income to cover 
operating expenses. In addition, the syndicate sells scrips that have not been claimed within 
the prescribed period. These shares are offered on Sunday morning at a public auction. The 
auction has a moderating effect on the price of shares in the informal market. 
Under normal conditions, Alicante's water is distributed in two canals simultaneously. 
Each has a fixed discharge of  150 Vs  achieved by using a balancing reservoir. The irrigation 
supply in each canal is rotated among different laterals with a rotation period of  23.5 days. A 
farmer takes the full discharge from a stream for the duration of  his irrigation determined by 
the script he has acquired for that particular rotation. With a constant discharge and duration 
of rotation, approximately the same total volume of water is delivered by each canal in each 
rotation period. 
In  Alicante, the ditchriders open and close all gates -  control gates for laterals and 
headgates for farms. The ditchrider collects the scrips from farmers in exchange for the water 
they  deliver, and  at the conclusion of  each rotation  they render a full accounting to the 
community's head office of all water released from the regulating basins. Maass and Anderson 
(1978) report that there were surprisingly short periods of running water not covered by scrips. 
When they did occur they almost always correlated with breaks or disruptions in the delivery 
system. The irrigation allocations as represented by the scrips held for each rotation matched 
the recorded delivery extremely well. 
The community makes an effort to provide irrigators with information so that they can 
make informed decisions in purchasing water. This includes having the ditchrider present at 
the time of informal trading and during the auction. The ditchrider can tell a farmer approxi- 
mately when water is likely to reach his farm. A bulletin board is used to post information 
about the water level in the storage reservoir, how much irrigation was delivered during the 
previous rotation, names of successful bidders, the number of hours each purchased, and the 
prices paid (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
Mutunl canal compnnies in the Poudre Vnlley, Colorado,  USA. In the mutual canal companies 
in the Poudre Valley irrigation is delivered from various sources and requires close control of 
the water and precise records of deliveries to users. Each company predicts the available 
supply per share before the season starts and updates this continually as the river discharge 
and the status of water in reservoirs change. Farmers plan their crops and irrigation demand 
on the basis of the shares of water owned and the expected price of shares they can rent. The cHAplER5  47 
Periods of 24 hours or multiples of 24 are avoided so that individuals do not receive their 
irrigation at the same time each period and that all will have a turn at night. 
Since rotation is practiced when the irrigation supply is low. the duration is important and 
often computed to the closest minute. In some systems, there is a rule that the national radio 
time announcement be used as  the reference for rotation and all fanners are  expected to own 
or share a clock or watch to be able to comply. In one system, the organization owns a watch 
that is handed from one irrigator to the next, together with the rotation list at the completion 
of each irrigation turn. The rotation list states the starting time for each farmer’s irrigation 
delivery. 
In the third irrigation distribution method observed, one  or several trusted persons  had to 
irrigate all fields in the entire system. In the case investigated, the water supply was not 
sufficient for continuous  delivery to all fields at once though it was adequate for complete 
irrigation of the command area. The irrigators  realized that there would be  fewer conflicts and 
that they would not need to spend as much time in their fields, especially at night, if  a few 
people handled the entire distribution in an impartial way. The arrangement in this case was 
a contract with several irrigators from the system. The contract was approved by  all the 
irrigators. Monitoring was done by individual fanners to ensure that irrigation was complete 
in their own fields but they were not allowed to interfere with the distribution. Contracts for 
water distribution are also sometimes given when the fields are far from the residence of most 
of the irrigators. In such cases, it is convenience rather than the reduction of conflicts that is 
important. 
Huertu of Vdemiu Typically, the service areas  of the Valencia canals are divided into three 
parts and the irrigation supply is rotated among the three for periods proportional to the area. 
Within each service area the canal discharge is divided into lateds by  permanent and 
frequently ungated proportional dividers called lenguns (Maass and Anderson  1978). The 
proportional dividers automatically separate the flow into correct proportions regardless of 
the discharge. 
The control structures at the head of rotation units are gates that can be locked. Only the 
canal guards are authorized to operate the gates. Within the lateral, during ordinary low flow 
periods, each farmer takes the water as won  as it reaches his headgate and he is allowed to 
continue using it until he decides he has had enough water. 
During periods of extraordinary drought, the water in the river is taken alternately by left 
or right bank canals for two days at a time. This halves the time available to irrigate but doubles 
the discharge for the duration of the irrigation period making it easier to move water to the 
far end of the canals. As the water supply diminishes, the time between successive irrigations 
may become so long that fanners are no  longer allowed to take all the water they want. Fanners 
are then given a time limit, generally fifteen minutes, for irrigating each half hectare. This is 
enforced by  the ditchrider. Under  such conditions there is usually  not enough water for 
complete irrigation and each farmer must decide which crop to favor. 
Huertu ofAlicunte. In Alicante, most farmers own some water shares but most do not have 
enough to irrigate all their land at a given time. Some shares are also owned by the irrigation 
syndicate. A share is designated by the duration of time a farmer is allowed to receive water 48  CHAPTER 5 
during  an irrigation delivery rotation. Scrips, provisional certificates that are negotiable, 
stating the amount of time the owner can receive water are available at the office. The scrips 
are printed in twelve denominations of  delivery time from one hour down to one-third of a 
minute. When it is announced that the next irrigation rotation is about to start, farmers go and 
collect the scrips to represent the shares that they own. A farmer who does not need all of his 
water in the next rotation can sell some of  his scrips to a farmer who needs more water. 
An informal market is conducted principally on Sunday and Thursday mornings. There 
is no posted price or hawking. Huerta men stand around in small groups and talk in subdued 
voices about the price of water and in the process negotiate sales. The prices paid by a farmer 
for a one-hour script or fraction of one varies over the morning as the supply and demand 
relations develop. 
The irrigation syndicate also owns some water as a means to provide an income to cover 
operating expenses. In addition, the syndicate sells scrips that have not been claimed within 
the prescribed period. These shares are offered on Sunday morning at a public auction. The 
auction bas a moderating effect on the price of shares in the informal market. 
Under normal conditions, Alicante’s water is distributed in two canals simultaneously. 
Each has a fixed discharge of  150 Us  achieved by using a balancing reservoir. The irrigation 
supply in each canal is rotated among different laterals with a rotation period of 23.5 days. A 
farmer takes the full discharge from a stream for the duration of his irrigation determined by 
the script he has acquired for that particular rotation. With a constant discharge and duration 
of rotation, approximately the same total volume of water is delivered by each canal in each 
rotation period. 
In  Alicante, the ditchriders open and close all gates -  control gates for laterals and 
headgates for farms. The ditchrider collects the scrips from fanners in exchange for the water 
they  deliver, and at the conclusion of  each rotation  they  render a full accounting to the 
community’s head office of all water released from the regulating basins. Maass and Anderson 
(1  978) report that there were surprisingly short periods of running water not covered by scrips. 
When they did occur they almost always correlated with breaks or disruptions  in the delivery 
system. The irrigation allocations as represented by the scrips held for each rotation matched 
the recorded delivery extremely well. 
The community makes an effort to provide irrigators with information so that they can 
make informed decisions in purchasing water. This includes having the ditchrider present at 
the time of informal trading and during the auction. The ditchrider can tell a farmer approxi- 
mately when water is likely to reach his farm. A bulletin board is used to post information 
about the water level in the storage reservoir, how much irrigation was delivered during the 
previous rotation, names of successful bidders, the number of hours each purchased, and the 
prices paid (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
Mutual caul  companies  in the Poudre Valley, Colorado, USA.  In the mutual canal companies 
in the Poudre Valley irrigation is delivered from various sources and requires close control of 
the water and precise records of  deliveries to users. Each company predicts the available 
supply per share before the season starts and updates this continually as the river discharge 
and the status of water in reservoirs change. Fanners plan their crops and imgation demand 
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irrigation company’s secretary keeps an  account for each irrigation  user. The quantity 
allocated per share each month from all sources is added to the account. Deductions are made 
from the account each time water is delivered. 
Most companies deliver water for three to five days each week. If the demand is high they 
deliver water every day. The rules vary among companies hut in most, fanners must place a 
delivery request with the company office by noon on Saturday to receive water in a planned 
irrigation delivery that begins on  Monday. The larger canals deliver by divisions. Water is 
turned into the upper division as swn  as the water arrives and sequentially to each division 
down the system until eventually all divisions are delivering water to fanners at the same time. 
At the end of the delivery the upper division is shut down first. The last division may finish 
deliveries a day or so after the first division has shut down. The canal superintendent adjusts 
the major canal checks each day during a delivery to assure that all divisions and major laterals 
receive adequate water to fulfill fanner requests (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
Each division has a ditchrider who also measures the water at the head of his division to 
determine that there is enough inflow to supply the fanners who have placed orders. The 
ditchrider opens, closes and adjusts headgates to make sure that the water is delivered to the 
proper users. In most companies, the ditchrider locks the headgate to keep the fanner from 
either opening it to take a larger supply or closing it early and possibly flooding a downstream 
farm. 
Small companies with a service area less than 2,000  ha represent ahout 60  percent of the 
companies in the area. These generally deliver the water to farmers on  an informal basis. One 
person functioning  as  superintendent,  recordkeeper, and ditchrider handles water distribution 
problems as  he travels up and down the ditch, setting headgates to deliver water to the farmers. 
He knows how many shares each water user  has and how much water each is entitled to receive 
and he can adjust deliveries to make the most effective use of water available in the canal. 
When demands get too great for the  water available, the superintendent sets up specific 
delivery times for fanners or he institutes rotations or other means of rationing water to meet 
demands. Most fanners will be served within a few days of when they order water (Maass 
and Anderson 1978). 
Pithuwa Irrigation System Chiwan, Nepal. The Pitbuwa Irrigation System was constructed 
in 1968 by the Department of Irrigation and was expanded later. Though the physical works 
are still the property of the government, management of operation and maintenance has been 
turned over to the irrigators. The farmers also control expenditure of the maintenance  budget 
issued by the central government. 
Duringtherainy season.irrigationisdistrihutedcontinuouslytoal1  l6ofthe  branchcanals 
most of the time. During periods of  shortage, the main system committee manges a rotation 
system by preparing a list that allocates the time for groups of outlets to receive water. The 
allocation is based on a preseason register prepared by each branch canal. Fanners in each 
branch register the type of crop and the area of each they will plant that season. This identifies 
the share of water they are entitled to within the branch. The sum of all proposed areas in a 
branch is the basis for computing the relative share of water each branch should receive from 
the system. Since water  is often in short supply, this allows the scarcity to be  shared 50  CHAFTER 5 
proportionally according  to the cropped area. The area each farm family declares for planting 
also determines their share of the system maintenance work. 
During periods of water shortage and for winter and spring crops, the irrigation supply is 
rotated among the branch canals according to the allocation schedule. While farmers are not 
bound to planting the area they registered and can receive irrigation for additional land when 
water is available, during periods of scarcity they only receive the share of water for which 
they registered. The branch canal committee is responsible for controlling the distribution 
within the branch. They set up a timed rotation during periods of  shortage (Baxter and Laitos 
1988). 
Agency-Managed Systems 
Irrigation distribution in Java, Indonesia. As mentioned in Chapter 4, irrigation allocation in 
agency-managed systems in Java is based on some form of the pasten method. The field-level 
demand  is used  to  allocate the available irrigation  supply  among tertiary  blocks.  This 
procedure takes place every 10 to 15 days. The distribution system is designed to allow the 
discharge to be adjusted in each canal according to the allocation. 
To allow the necessary flexibility in irrigation delivery that the allocation plan suggests, 
virtually every canal bifurcation is fitted with adjustable gates that can control both head and 
discharge. To monitor the delivery, there is provision for discharge measurement in canals. 
Because of the large number of  structures, standard designs are used and it is assumed that 
the gate operator will fine-tune the gate setting to meet the target discharge. 
The operating procedure is to adjust the gates as soon as the new target discharges are 
released, i.e.,  every 10 to 15 days. Except for fluctuations caused by changes in the supply 
from the river. the discharge should be constant throughout the period. The field staff are to 
monitor the discharge and make the necessary minor adjustments to achieve target discharges. 
A study undertaken by  IIMI (Murray-Rust and Vermillion 1989) reports a number of 
difficulties in the implementation of  these distribution procedures in Java. In the systems 
studied, 1540  percent of the structures  are in sufficiently pr  condition so  that their utility 
is reduced. As many  as 20 percent of  the measurement structures were broken in the best 
systems and up to 75 percent in some. Those that were operational were often not calibrated 
to assure accuracy. Thus the actual control and monitoring of  the irrigation delivery were 
much lower than anticipated by the policy. 
The study further reports that the lowered level of  control leads to sufficiently large daily 
variations in discharge throughout the system so that it is impossible to make the necessary 
gate adjustments to maintain the target discharges. The downstream canals show the highest 
variability in discharge. Field reprting of actual water conditions generally states that the 
allocation plan has been implemented while observation shows large discrepancies. 
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IRRIGATION DISTRIBUTION IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
PROGRAMS 
Often,  irrigation allocation and distribution are used synonymously to refer to water delivery. 
Emphasis is placed on  the action of moving the water without evaluating the underlying rules 
that regulate distribution. Separating the rules from the action allows inspection of both and 
provides a tool for monitoring irrigation delivery performance. 
Together with irrigation distribution procedures. monitoring methods need to be devel- 
oped to test irrigation delivery against the planned allocation. Suitable punitive laws must also 
he prepared for not complying with the rules. For example, if the agency fails to deliver water 
within the specified range of quantity and timing, there might be a reduction in irrigation fees. 
The penalty if irrigators do not follow the irrigation plan should also be clearly identified. In 
other words, there must be a balance between the rights and responsibilities in all groups - 
the agency staff as well as the irrigators. The ability to implement sanctions will depend on 
both the irrigators’ organization and the agency staff. Affective implementation would be a 
signal of successful management. 
Assistance to Locally Managed Systems 
Monitoring is built into the irrigation distribution process of most locally managed systems. 
One reason that proportional  dividing structures are popular when  discharge and water 
demand conditions are right is the ease in monitoring irrigation delivery. Compared to most 
adjustable gates with turbulent nonlinear undertlow. proportional dividers are easily checked 
and relatively accurate. Timed rotational delivery is easy to monitor but has a higher cost 
associated with managing the water in the field. In Nepal, surveys showed that fanners spent 
five times more time managing rotational irrigation delivery than continuous delivery using 
proportional dividers (Martin 1986). In addition, during rotational distribution fanners need 
to be present in the field during their turn, day or night, or they will lose their irrigation. 
With notable exceptions like the mutual companies in the United States and the simpler 
case  of  Subak Gunung of Bali,  most  locally  managed  systems have devised means of 
delivering shares of  the irrigation supply without resorting to volumetric measure. In many 
cases, the supply is simply divided proportionally without regard for crop water requirements 
or  other intervening losses. In others, as in  Valencia, consideration is given to crops by 
changing the allocation rules during drought and delivering  irrigation according to crop needs 
rather than according to shares of the resource. 
The 2,500-ha system in Alicante has achieved and  sustained remarkable success in 
maintaining a constant discharge distribution system. Two elements are important in Ali- 
cante’s irrigation delivery. The size of each delivery stream is small enough for it to be still 
manageable by one fanner and the discharge rate is constant. The large stream size makes it 
possible for rapid coverage to distant locations in fields. The constant discharge rate allows 
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experience is important when advance orders need to be placed for delivery. Both of  these 
factors help increase application efficiency. 
Assistance projects should facilitate selection of  structures designed to provide ease in 
meeting the irrigation allocation rules and to allow effective monitoring by  all irrigators. 
Designing for a great deal of flexibility to allow high efficiency in irrigation delivery may be 
counterproductive.  There is danger that flexibility will overwhelm the ability to monitor and 
will create conflicts that reduce both effectiveness and efficiency in irrigation delivery. 
Turnover and Management Transfer 
Most locally managed systems have well-defined allocation rules that are fully understood by 
all irrigators. Frequently, even young children can identify how many shares of water belong 
to their family fields. There are examples, however, like Thambesi Kulo System where only 
rudimentary rules exist to define rotation blocks. While all Thambesi Kulo fanners could 
describe the rotation they used few could explain why. The system operated much like many 
agency systems in Nepal where the head-end fanners receive water first and take all they can 
use. Fanners at the lower end of the system must decide, based on past experience, whether 
it is worthwhile planting a crop that requires irrigation. 
In  many  agency-built systems, the management staff  fail to fully communicate the 
irrigation allocation plan to the fanners. This leads to the uncertainty in planning field activities 
and the inability of fanners to monitor the delivery status, a situation which in some cases 
may be intentional. Murray-Rust and Vermillion (1989) reported that in systems studied in 
Java using the pasten method of imgation allocation, 90  percent of  the fanners interviewed 
did not know the official crop plan or planting schedule. This has important consequences for 
turnover and management transfer programs. Without experiencing reliable irrigation deliv- 
ery, most irrigators will be reluctant to take on greater management responsibility unless they 
also have freedom to redefine the rules and irrigation delivery procedures. 
If fanners are to take over full management control of  a system they will need to have 
experience with developing allocation rules and will need to be able to exercise sufficient 
control over irrigation delivery to implement their plan. This is even more difficult when 
fanners have management control over only part of the system and need to coordinate with 
the agency that controls the water source. The Poudre Valley systems in Colorado illustrate 
that this can be done if there is sufficient communication with the agency and commitment 
on the part of the agency to deliver water according to the allocation plan. 
Knowledge and familiarity with the allocation plan alone are  not sufficient. Maintenance 
must be adequate  and unauthorized deliveries controlled. The underpinning of most successful 
locally managed systems is a disciplined organization that has  been able to control access and 
free riders and to mobilize labor for maintenance. It cannot be  assumed that shifting manage- 
ment to the local level will automatically result in management improvements unless these 
other essential conditions  are  met and incentives to follow the rules are  in place. 
Locally managed systems have demonstrated that they  have the ability to implement 
complex rules sequentially to match changing conditions  within a cropping season. Turnover CHAPTER 5  53 
and management transfer programs do not need to emphasize simplicity. However. allocation 
rules must be widely agreed to -therefore,  known to all irrigators -  and all possible effort 
must be made to ensure irrigation delivery according to rules. Locally managed systems are 
successful under difficult conditions when results follow directly from the irrigators actions, 
i.e.. when cause and effect are clear. As stated by Levine and Coward (1989). 
...  decisions should be based upon the probabilities of effective implementation, not 
on  possibililies. Modern irrigation experience has more than its shore of  systems 
designed on the basis ofpossibilities that were not realized. CHAPTER 6 
Resource Mobilization 
INTRODUCTION 
LOCALRESOURCE MOBILIZATION  is described as activities of local people in mobilizing their 
internal resources as well as regional or state resources (Ujjwal Pradhan  1988). If  local 
irrigators, using their political linkages, can draw on financial and technical assistance from 
the state, this too is considered local resource mobilization. Irrigators of locally managed 
irrigation systems have become quite adept at lobbying for resources external to the system. 
However, the objective in this chapter is to try and understand the purpose and methods used 
by local groups for mobilizing resources from the local community. 
Irrigators in locally managed systems usually  devise a way  to verify that they  have 
received their expected outcome when their costs are directly related to irrigation benefits. If 
leaders and staff responsible for operation and maintenance of a system are accountable  to the 
irrigators, the irrigators monitor their work. 
LOCALLY USED RESOURCES 
Many locally built irrigation systems mobilized most, if not all, of the cash, labor, knowledge, 
and materials and equipment necessary for system construction from the local community. 
The mutual canal companies in the Western United States, the Thulo Kulo System in Nepal, 
and Subak Gunung System in Bali are examples where such mobilization bas taken place. 
Though there  are perhaps hundreds of  thousands of  locally managed systems currently 
operating throughout the world, with the exception of groundwater systems, few new ones 
are being built. Most locations feasible  for imgation by local technology without mechanized 
lift have already been developed. 
Resource mobilization for maintenance and system improvement is a major and continu- 
ing activity in most locally managed systems. Pracbanda Pradban (1989) describes mobiliza- 
tion of six types of resources in his comparative  study of 2  1 fanner-managed  irrigation systems 
in Nepal. These are: 
*  Labor, 
*  Cash in lieu of labor, 
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* 
*  Stone and forest products, 
*  Equipment, and 
*  Local expertise and knowledge. 
Cash assessed to purchase supplies, 
Labor is the primary resource contributed by irrigators in all of the systems. Paying cash 
in lieu of  labor is an option in most. Cash, assessed on the same basis as irrigation allocation, 
is raised to purchase nonlocal supplies like cement, wire, and pipes. Stones and forest products 
acquired locally are used for maintaining diversions and for building conveyance and control 
smctures. Pradhan reports that bullock carts are requisitioned for hauling materials in some 
systems. Finally, local expertise and knowledge are a vital resource in successful construction 
and maintenance. 
Most systems have rules and procedures for implementing “routine” maintenance on a 
regular basis.  Emergency repairs  are often  handled  differently. The basis for  resource 
contributions by irrigators may be according to the size of landholding, water share, house- 
hold, status of the fanner as  perceived by the community, land tenure, or productivity of land. 
The following examples examine the rules and procedures used by  several locally managed 
systems to mobilize essential resources for operation and maintenance. 
Chhattis Mauja Irrigation System4 
System description. The Chhattis Mauja Irrigation System diverts water from the Tinau River 
at Butwal, Nepal. The main canal is 11 km long with 44  branch canals. Irrigation is delivered 
to about 2,500 households living in the 3,500-ha command area. The system was originally 
constructed by local landowners in the mid-1850s. From the late 1940s through the 1970s 
migrants from the hills cleared the dense jungle and settled in the upper command area. The 
550 km2  catchment of the river is in the southern Himalayan hills but the irrigated area is on 
the piedmont plain just south of the hills. Rainy-season  floods repeatedly damage  the diversion 
and intake canal. Bedload consisting of small stones, gravel and sand are deposited in the 
upper reach of  the canal and fine sediment travels the length of  the canal. Repair of the 
diversion and removal of sediment are ongoing activities. 
Irrigation allocation is by shares  based on the request of each branch canal. Each irrigation 
share carries with  it the responsibility to  contribute one share of  all  maintenance  and 
improvement expenses for the main canal and diversions. Each share also gives one vote to 
the irrigators of the branch in deciding the affairs related to management of the main system. 
In 1989, there were 175 shares claimed by  the 44  branch canals. Proportional equivalence of 
benefits, costs and representation has worked well primarily because of  the need to mobilize 
a large amount of labor, cash, and materials for maintenance. 
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The charter of  authority for operating the Chhattis Mauja System rests with the General 
Assembly, It is composed of representatives from each branch canal -  one for each irrigation 
share. While meetings of the General Assembly  are. open to all irrigators, only the repre- 
sentatives appointed by each branch are eligible to vote. 
Resources used. In 1987/88, ahout 7,600 person-days were spent in desilting the main canal 
and another 7,300 person-days in cleaning the branch and field canals. Main canal desilting 
took 13 days and on average 760 persons were working each day. According to  the secretary’s 
report to the General Meeting, an additional 18,900 person-days of labor were requested for 
emergency repairs of  the diversion and intake canals. When the expenditure to pay salaries 
for managers and messengers, office overhead, and payments of  cash instead of  labor and 
cash fines were included, the fanners of the Chhattis Mauja System paid about US$4O,OOO to 
operate and maintain the system in the 1988/89 cropping year. The following figure gives a 
breakdown of how these fanner payments were used. 
Use of  US$4O,OOO labor and cash payments made by the Chhattis Mauja farmers in the 1988/89 
monsoon, winter, and dry seasons. 
(15.2%) 
Source: Yoder, 1992. 
Each branch canal is assessed at US$Z.2O/water share each year to pay the salaries of the 
main system messengers. In  1987, US$24/water share. were collected to purchase wire for 
improvement of  the diversion. In addition to labor and cash, forest products and stone are 
gathered for use in repairs. During the 1988 monsoon season, the diversion structures were 
repaired 34 times. It was estimated that over 100 tons of  brush and branches were used in the 
repair work. Rapidly growing species of woody-brush with little commercial value as fuel or 
building materials are used for the repairs. Collecting brush from the hill slopes above the 
town of Butwal for maintenance, however, has contributed to erosion. 
Rules and procedures. The payments due from branch committees are read in the General 
Assembly meeting each year. In 1988, a total of about US$1,300 was collected from branch 
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assessments must  be made  before desilting work  can be  assigned to  the  branch canal 
organization. This has been  an  effective method of forcing irrigators to make their payments 
by a certain date. By longstanding tradition, and now written into the constitution as well, if 
irrigators from a branch canal do not participate in the annual desilting work their outlet can 
be closed. If  an outlet is closed it will only be reopened by  [he executive committee after 
receipt of the full payment of arrears plus a fine. 
Currently, the system-level rules empower the executive committee to hire one or more 
managers to direct the day-to-day affairs of maintenance and irrigation delivery. The manager 
is given authority to distribute the work load for canal desilting, call for labor to cany out 
emergency repairs, and monitor that the work  is properly carried out and, if  not, assess 
penalties. He also informs the irrigators if they need to bring tools to the work site. 
Hill Irrigation Systems in  Nepal 
Many locally managed hill irrigation systems mobilize large amounts of labor from their 
members. Almost all of the labor and cash are  used for system maintenance and improvement. 
Daily maintenance in the form of plugging small leaks in the earthen canal or repairing the 
diversion is so common that it is generally considered a part of system operation. One or more 
individuals may be employed to patrol the canal or the task may be rotated among all the 
members. In most systems,  there is little maintenance work required in the command area and 
irrigation distribution is generally a family activity. So, most  operation and maintenance 
expenditure goes into diverting and conveying the irrigation supply from the source to the 
upper reach of  the  command area.  This cost is generally shared by  all irrigators using 
conventions to which they have all agreed. 
The following table presents the average annual labor contribution by members of six 
systems in Nepal's  central hills. This includes labor for routine maintenance as well as 
emergencies. The source of infopation was the written attendance record of each organiza- 
tion. A larger sample would show a much greater variation in labor requirements per hectare. 
The systems listed are among the more difficult to maintain of those observed in the hills of 
Nepal. 
In addition to labor, significant cash assessments have been required for improvements 
in some systems. Cash is primarily used to purchase materials such as cement or pipes. It may 
also be used to pay skilled laborers not available in the village, such as masons or experienced 
Nnnd diggers. 
While direct cash and labor contributions by  member irrigators constitute the  most 
common method for paying irrigation operation and maintenance expenses, other sources of 
income have also been observed. In the Tbulo Kulo System of Chherlung. water was sold by 
increasing the number of shares in the system by  20 percent in 1958. The cash income to the 
organization was used to improve the diversion and canal in order to deliver more water. In 
1984, the canal organization installed a grain processing mill powered by water from the canal. 
After six years of operation the installation cost was paid and the net income from milling CHAPTER  6  59 
grain has since been used to help defray operation and maintenance expenses of the irrigation 
system. 
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Where labor and cash requirements for maintenance are high, as in Argali and Chherlung, 
assessment for payment by  individual farmers is proportional to the share of the irrigation 
supply they are entitled to receive. Rules are generally explicit and written in the minutes of 
meetings where all the irrigators are invited to attend and participate in the decision-making 
process. Many systems excuse the elected system leaders from physical work but most include 
them for cash assessments. Rules for emergency repairs are almost universally based on the 
household rather than shares of water used for routine maintenance. The Raj Kulo System and 
others can also include nonirrigators -those  that use the canal for domestic needs -in their 
call for labor when there is an extraordinary emergency, though this has not been  necessary 
for a number of decades. 
Use of a household basis for mobilizing labor for emergencies was a hotly debated issue 
in the Raj Kulo System’s annual meeting in  1982. Small landowners complained that this 
practice was unfair because they were obliged to contribute  as much as  large landowners while 
receiving less benefit. Though the majority of  members were small holders, they concluded 
that the practice was necessary to ensure sufficient labor during emergencies. While they 
decided to keep the rule, they modified the definition of an emergency. All repairs that could 
easily be completed without danger of water stress to crops were to be done on the same basis 
as routine maintenance, i.e..  labor mobilization according to irrigation shares. An emergency 
is only to be declared if there is danger that crops will suffer. In a similar situation in Indonesia, 
Ambler (1989) reports that repairs that can be completed in two days are considered routine 
but if more than two days are required emergency mobilization of all irrigators is required. 
Most systems observed in Nepal levy cash fines when members do not contribute labor 
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labor. This allows persons with other income options to pay cash without penalty. Since most 
hill residents are subsistence fanners, some cash income to the organization is desirable. 
However, for emergency maintenance the penalty rate is generally increased to encourage 
more persons to attend work in order to complete repairs on time. Emergency maintenance 
often involves working in dangerous conditions -  many systems report accidents that have 
resulted in deaths -and shirking is heavily penalized. 
Mutual Canal Companies in the Poudre Valley, Colorado, USA 
Irrigators were heavily involved with the construction of canals of  the mutual companies. 
They contributed labor, equipment, and  horses for hauling. The contribution of  time by 
members as voluntary  leaders continues today  (Early 1990). However, most of  the major 
companies have a specialized maintenance group and do not require labor from the irrigators 
for routine or emergency purposes.  Usually, the company manager hires a maintenance 
foreman to oversee the work. There may be  several persons on the maintenance crew all year 
and permanent employees who have operational duties during the irrigation season also join 
the maintenance crew during the off-season.  Maintenance work continues throughout the year, 
including equipment repair in the workshop when weather conditions do not allow outdoor 
work. 
Funds for improvements and major construction come either directly from assessments 
on water shares held by  stockholders, from commercial bank loans, or as loans from state 
agencies. At the annual meeting of shareholders, the activities and expenditures of  the past 
year are reviewed and a new budget is passed. The budget must include payment of capital 
and interest from earlier loans, projection of any new project, and the normal operation and 
maintenance expense. The shareholders must then decide, on a share basis, on the assessment 
that will be necessary to cover the budget. Voting is according to the shares of stock in the 
company owned by each member. Thus a farmer’s operating costs, his water deliveries, and 
his representation in decision making are computed on the same basis -  the shares of stock 
that he owns. A standard procedure in many of the companies is to require stockholders to 
pay about 40 percent of their annual assessment before water is delivered. 
Other Systems 
Dani and Siddiqi (1987) describe resource mobilization in the Aliabad Irrigation System 
located in the Hunza Valley of  NoRh  Pakistan. Aliabad was established during the late 
nineteenth century when the Mir of Hunza authorized construction of an irrigation channel to 
lead water from the Ultor Glacier to the relatively flat area down the valley. In this arid 
environment, all agricultural crops, including fruit and fuel-wood trees, are entirely dependent 
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Each year, the canal is cleaned and repaired and every household in the village is required 
to  participate in  these activities. The canal is divided into portions that are assigned to 
subsections of the irrigation community for repair. Minor repairs are made by the persons 
assigned to patrol the canal but major problems are handled by  mobilizing the user-group. 
Users downstream of the breach are required only to assist in the emergency repairs. As in 
the Chhattis Mauja case, Aliabad irrigators can pay cash for a labor exemption. 
In Northern Thailand, Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong (1983) reports details of  resource mobi- 
lization for several people's irrigation systems. She emphasizes the value of local leadership 
as a resource in itself. Effective leadership makes productive use of  labor and materials. She 
describes meetings of  the system leaders shortly before annual repairs are to begin where the 
discussion is largely about planning the work  strategy, and determining necessary labor, 
materials and equipment. Leaders are selected for their experience  and knowledge in repairing 
the weir and canal, so their decisions are seldom questioned. 
Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong (1983) describes three resource mobilization principles that are 
followed in the Muang Mai Irrigation System. This system imgates about 560 ha of rice and 
in addition some orchard crops. The first method of mobilization is used to call a portion of 
the irrigation laborers for routine activities such as canal cleaning and repairing the diversion 
weir. Members have an obligation to contribute one person-day of labor for each rui (0.16 ha) 
of land they cultivate. While work under the first method of mobilization is underway, each 
family decides when they will contribute and the work force varies from 100 to more than 
300 on a given day. Strict accounting of attendance is kept for this. 
The second form of mobilization calls for the entire work force to be mobilized. This is 
usually only called during emergencies or if  canal cleaning or weir repair needs to  be 
completed quickly. Often, this is requested at short notice. Though all are  expected to work, 
this is carried out on a voluntary basis and no record is kept of who participates. The third 
labor mobilization principle is only used when the government is providing assistance in 
improving an irrigation system. The irrigation leaders call for a portion of the members to 
work for pay as hired laborers under government supervision. If the improvement project is 
for the Muang Mai System, members of the system have first priority to be hired as laborers. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSISTING LOCALLY MANAGED SYSTEMS 
In recent years, the national policy in many countries has made subsidized assistance  available 
for irrigation development. Irrigators from locally managed systems have seized this oppor- 
tunity to improve their systems. They solicit help for improving their irrigation works in order 
to increase the amount of  water available, make delivery more reliable, and to decrease 
operating costs. In most cases, well-directed assistance can make an important contribution 
to the reliability and sustainability of  locally managed systems. When forest products and 
other local materials that have traditionally been used for maintenance are no longer readily 
available, substitutes such as rock-filled wire cages are  necessary. However, these cost more 
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ones. Frequently, this is justified but there are several factors in addition to cost that must be 
considered. Access to supplies and skilled labor for future maintenance are two concerns. 
Coward and Martin (1986)  caution that in  providing  assistance to locally  managed 
systems, there has been a trend for shifting initial and recumng costs from the private sector 
to the  public sector. Not only  are locally managed  systems provided with  sophisticated 
structures for which they are required to pay little or nothing, but the burden of maintenance 
is also transferred to the agency. In too many cases, the members of the agency staff become 
the managers and hire fanners to perform maintenance activities that they have previously 
performed on their own. Coward and Martin argue that there is a need for public assistance 
but that it must be provided in a manner that reduces initial and continuing public costs while 
reinforcing the capacity of local groups to mobilize resources which they control. 
Another reason for careful consideration of public assistance is the high variability in the 
capacity of locally managed systems to manage mobilization of their own resources and their 
ability to use assistance effectively. All the examples given above are of  systems where 
resource mobilization is highly successful. All have developed the level of  organization and 
leadership they needed and have established the necessary rules for effective maintenance. 
Assistance to the Chhattis Mauja or Thulo Kulo systems, for example, can be made directly 
through their established organizations. 
Frequently, however, in systems where assistance is most needed the organizations are 
weak and have not been able to establish effective operating rules or the necessary control to 
enforce rules. In  cases where the local organization is weak  or fractured, a community 
organizing approach with honest brokers who have good social interaction skills have been 
successful in strengthening local organization (Reyes and Jopillo 1987; and Bruns 1992). In 
assistance to locally managed systems, the project needs to discern not only the type of 
physical improvement necessary but also the use of the assistance activity to strengthen the 
institutions that must, in the future, operate and maintain the improved facilities. 
Each locally managed system has a unique history of resource mobilization. Assistance 
projects must review that history individually and utilize the experience that exists and assist 
in strengthening areas in which the irrigators are weak. An  area of need found in Nepal in 
systems requiring improved  management capacity was  accounting. Enabling the  estab- 
lishment of simple recordkeeping systems open to public scrutiny was important in raising 
the level of trust which allowed leadership to emerge and rules to be enforced. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT TRANSFER AND TURNOVER 
PROGRAMS 
Coward and Martin (1986) examined resource mobilization by fanners in selected locally 
managed irrigation systems in Nepal, the Philippines, and India (Tamil Nadu). They found 
the level of resources contributed by fanners in these. representative systems to be significantly 
higher than the fees collected from fanners in most irrigation systems managed by government 
irrigation agencies in the same countries. Examples of successful resource mobilization by 
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equivalence between resources provided and benefits derived from the system. Ostrom (1992) 
highlights this as one of eight design principles that characterize long-enduring, self-organ- 
id,  irrigation institutions. 
Ensuring that benefits reflect costs identifies  another important feature observed in locally 
managed systems. Control of decisions affecting resource mobilization is placed as directly 
as possible with those who are to benefit from the action taken. This allows actions considered 
to be “fair” in terms that reflect local customs and cultural values. This does not imply that 
all locally derived practices are acceptable and that change should never be imposed as a 
condition for assistance. However, many local practices have a logic, with historical origins, 
that makes them acceptable even though they appear to an outsider to be inequitable. Rules 
imposed to bring “equality” in such a situation will likely be rejected. 
The Tallo Kulo System in Chherlung provides an example of apparent inequality. When 
their own diversion was destroyed by a landslide, the Tallo Kulo irrigators, over a period of 
several years, negotiated an agreement to use the intake of a small system diverting water just 
upstream of their own. The terms of  the agreement reflect prior water rights and include 
provision for all maintenance to be done by the Tallo Kulo fanners, Upon inspection, today, 
it appears that head-end fanners with a small irrigated area are exploiting  the rest of the system 
while Tallo Kulo fanners consider this an acceptable, “fair” arrangement. 
In  the Chhattis Mauja System, irrigators in each branch canal participate directly in 
deciding the methods they want to use to operate and maintain the branch and field channels. 
They also decide directly how they will share responsibility for cash, labor, and  material 
requests from the system and joint-system levels. The quantity, timing and nature of  the 
expenditure for the Chhattis Mauja main canal are controlled indirectly by  the irrigators 
through their election of officials whom they hold accountable for decisions  and actions. Local 
control and accountability are important features that must be built into management transfer 
and turnover projects. 
There is widespread mistrust that fees and materials collected for future use will not be 
available when needed. Locally managed systems overcome this problem by collecting funds 
and materials only at the time they are to be used. While this places a limit on the size of 
improvement projects that can be done at one time, it has been successful in spreading the 
work over a longer period of time to use resources as they become available. While not all 
structures can be designed for such an approach, most improvement work could be designed 
for a more labor-intensive approach and spread over a longer period to allow full user 
participation. 
When resources are mobilized directly in response to needs and used locally, it allows 
results to be examined and evaluated directly by the contributors.  Most irrigation  fees collected 
by government agencies go to the central treasury and are redistributed to meet operation and 
maintenance costs. However, the timing and quantity of resources often do not coincide with 
payments made by irrigators or match local needs. When compounded by gross errors in fee 
assessment relative to delivered irrigation benefits, irrigators resist paying the fees. 
For  most  irrigators involved in turnover and management transfer, the necessity to 
increase individual expenditure of labor, cash, materials and equipment, leadership, etc., for 
sgstem operation and maintenance is a negative incentive. This must be overcome to achieve 
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individual cost will bring sufficient returns and are worthwhile. This will only come about as 
irrigators gain experience. Experience can be enhanced by reorienting assistance activities, 
especially the construction work, that accompany most management transfer and turnover 
projects. Instead of using contractors from outside the community supervised by the agency, 
control of construction should be shifted to the irrigators. This should include setting  priorities. 
preparing and approving designs, and involving the fanners in the actual construction. 
The irrigators should be assisted in  doing as much  of  the improvement as possible 
themselves and in hiring their own contractor for what they cannot do. Completion of work 
ceremonies should confirm success in taking responsibility for local management rather than 
attempt to “hand over’’ responsibility of work completed by the agency. When they have no 
voice in making decisions or controlling construction, irrigators resent being “handed over” 
structures they did not consider to be of  high priority and which they observed being built 
with inferior quality. They take pride in their own accomplishments even while recognizing 
flaws in their own work. CHAPTER 7 
The Irrigation Organization 
TIMELY  AND UNIMlRM application of the available irrigation supply to their fields is the goal 
irrigators desire to achieve. Acquiring water from a source, allocating the supply among 
eligible users, and then physically moving the water from the system intake to the field outlets 
are major tasks that make field application possible. 
A multitude of other supporting activities must take place for sustained operation and 
maintenance of irrigation systems. The successful operation of  most systems requires the 
systematic, unified effort of  many  persons. Roles must be defined, leadership appointed, 
decisions made,  accounts kept,  communication take place,  and  the results of  activities 
monitored. The inevitable conflicts that arise must be managed and appropriate discipline 
applied when free riding (using water without taking responsibility for costs) or shirking takes 
The organizational structure of  locally managed systems with generally well-defined 
membership, specialized roles, and decentralized, representative decision making help sustain 
the outcome of the supporting activities enabling successful operation and maintenance. This 
chapter starts with examples of organizational structures that have emerged to support and 
control the implementation of  tasks. Then it examines a number of critical supporting tasks 
before reviewing the reasons why irrigators of locally managed systems have found it so 




Membership in the Raj Kulo System in Argali is limited to cultivators of fields designated to 
grow rice irrigated by  the system. This has been the tradition for at least the last several 
generations. Owners, tenant fanners, and absentee landlords of the Raj Kulo’s rice fields can 
participate in making decisions and they constitute the system’s legitimate authority. Mem- 
bership has not been allowed to expand in recent years though there is land in the command 
area that could be converted to rice fields and owners of those fields are keen to become 
members. Fanners are concerned that their limited supply of irrigation water should not be 
overextended by  adding new fields. Clear definition of  the right to use irrigation and the 
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associated ability to regulate membership are important characteristics of  many  locally 
managed irrigation systems (Yoder 1986). 
In the larger Chhattis Audio System the situation is different. Individual fanner member- 
ship is only defined at the branch canal level  which  is the  lowest level in the  system. 
Identification of which fields or fanners are entitled to receive irrigation from their branch is 
a matter controlled by the village-level organization. Irrigators of  the branch determine the 
irrigation shares they need and maintenance responsibility they can handle. Other branch 
canals are not concerned if extra fields are irrigated in a given branch as long as  the irrigation 
share used is also the share of maintenance undertaken by irrigators from that branch. 
At the system level, the main concern is to mobilize enough labor for canal desilting and 
emergency repair. When abranch canal increases its number of shares this provides a welcome 
addition to the labor force. Though the irrigation supply is limited during the dry season from 
March through May, the supply is generally adequate for rice in the entire command area 
during the rainy season (Yoder forthcoming). 
In the Thambesi Kulo System in Nepal, membership is less clear. Any fanner needing 
irrigation can divert additional water from the stream provided there is water available and 
those with higher priority -  according to their field location -  are satisfied with their supply. 
It is up to the individual cultivators at the extremity of each rotation block to decide if it is 
feasible to irrigate with the supply that might reach their fields (Yoder 1986). 
Membership in the Sub& Gunung in Bali is based on investment in the construction of 
the canal (Pitana 1991). Membership in the Thulo Kulo in Chherlung, Nepal is also based on 
investment that includes the initial construction and subsequent improvements. Owning even 
the smallest fraction of a share entitles the shareholder to one vote in the assembly of irrigators 
in most hill systems in Nepal. 
In Valencia in Spain the service area of each canal was determined in the Middle Ages 
and has apparently not changed since. To be a member of the canal’s general assembly one 
must own land served by the canal. Renters do not have rights as members. Each member has 
one vote in the general assembly regardless of the size of  landholding. In Alicante, also in 
Spain, voting members of the general assembly must own at least 1.8 ha of land with the right 
to use water from the Tibi Reservoir. Landowners with the right to use water but with less 
land do not have a direct voice in the organization (Maass and Anderson 1978). 
Levels of Organization 
Different levels of irrigation operation are established at points in a canal where water is 
divided into smaller branches. The lowest operational level is established when a canal serves 
fields. The main canal level conveys the irrigation supply from the source. Iffields are irrigated 
directly from the main canal the system is operating at a single level. Small, fanner-built 
systems sometimes have only a single level. Most, however, have two or more levels. 
The Thulo Kulo System in Cbherlung divides water from the main to seven branch canals 
which serve the fanners’ fields. The first control structure after the diversions in the Chhattis 
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Chhattis Mauja fanners still consider the entire canal from the diversion to the last of the 44 
branch canals to be the main canal, in effect the dividing structure has added another level of 
operation. 
Frequently, there are levels of decision making, resource mobilization, communication. 
and conflict management that constitute  organizational levels parallel to the operational levels 
of  the system. The officials elected by  a joint assembly of the Sorah and Chhattis Mauja 
irrigators form a joint committee to operate and maintain the diversions and the first section 
of the main canal. The general assembly of farmers from all 44  branch canals elect the officials 
forming an executive committee to operate the main system level of the Chhattis Mauja. A 
similar committee operates the main system of the Sorah Mauja. Coinciding with the control 
of irrigation delivery from the main to branch canals. irrigators within each branch canal in 
the Chhattis Mauja System organize to operate and maintain the branch canal. Although there 
are additional divisions within most branch canals, where for part of the year smaller groups 
of  farmers form rotation  units, the Chhattis Mauja System is considered to  have three 
organizational levels that coincide with operational levels. There is one additional level of 
organization in the Chhattis Mauja that is mentioned below. 
Groupings that coincide with operational levels are the most common organizational 
structure for irrigation systems. These provide a mechanism for decentralized decision making 
and control of affairs that concern different groups of irrigators sharing a common distributary 
canal system. At the lowest organizational level they handle all tasks at their operational level. 
Generally, there is provision for representation of their interests in operation and maintenance 
in  each  organizational level  above them.  Though  this  structure is  the norm,  there are 
deviations. 
The Thulo Kulo in.Chherlung uses a general assembly that includes all persons owning 
an  irrigation share to elect officials and to manage operation and maintenance of the main 
system. Irrigators from each of the seven branch canals arrange to clean their own branch and 
organize the rotation of  irrigation delivery when necessary. However, there is no formal 
organization at the branch canal level. For the second organizational level, the Thulo Kulo 
departs from the norm. Instead of using the operational level, i.e., the branch canal operational 
level, to define their organizing group, they have formed seven maintenance gmups where 
fanners are carefully selected to represent geographical areas of the system. Each group is 
responsible for maintaining and operating the system one day each week. 
The Thulo Kulo irrigators have organized to respond in the best possible manner to their 
most demanding task maintenance of the diversion and main canal. By including members 
from all geographical parts of the system they overcome the problem of head enders not 
responding as diligently to maintenance needs as tail enders. Each day of the week, if the 
supply is less than desirable. the day’s group is responsible for making minor improvements 
in the canal and diversion. Determination of  adequate supply is monitored over the entire 
command area by members of  the group responsible for that day. 
In the Chhattis Mauja System there are area-level committees formed that include from 
three to ten branch canals. The two primary purposes of the area-level committees are to 
facilitate communication for mobilizing labor and to facilitate irrigation distribution. Rota- 
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committees. There are four organizational levels  in  the  system  including the  area-level 
committees, which are not based on an operational level. 
Uphoff  (1986) reports on  the  analysis of  50 irrigation case studies where levels of 
operation and organization were two of the variables examined. The study showed that there 
is a tendency for higher levels of organization to operate more formally though informal 
procedures and consensual norms also exist at the highest levels. The study also showed that 
direct participation of fanners in collective decision making is more feasible at lower levels. 
Engaging large numbers of fanners in deliberations is difficult and as  a result. representatives 
from lower levels tend to function as  part of the higher-level organizations in a form of indirect 
participation. Possibly the most important finding was that the difficulty in mobilizing labor 
increased at the higher levels. Although strong organizations, such as the Chhattis Mauja, can 
accomplish labor mobilization, in most systems cash -  to pay for salaries, materials, and 
equipment -  is more important than labor mobilization at higher levels in the system. 
Roles 
Locally managed irrigation systems demonstrate a wide variety of specialization. In  some 
cases, farmers participate in virtually all aspects of  management and any user may  fill any 
role that exists. At the other end of the spectrum there is a high degree of specialization where 
certain persons are assigned to very specific tasks (Uphoff 1986). Special roles evolve for a 
number of  reasons. Dividing labor is more efficient under certain conditions. Some tasks 
require specialized skills and experience. In other cases imgators want to avoid difficult or 
dangerous tasks. 
The Thulo Kulo in Chherlung and Subak Gunung in Bali used local specialists in rock 
cutting and tunneling when constructing and improving the canals. Rock cutting skills used 
in  constructing the Thulo Kulo,  as in  many  other systems in the same region, evolved 
generations earlier in the small-scale mining industry that once flourished nearby. Irrigators 
felt comfortable negotiating contracts with skilled persons they hired from nearby villages 
and in most cases worked side-by-side with them. Members in one system in Gulmi District 
of  Nepal, a system which  repeatedly  hired  local tunnel diggers to  improve their canal, 
eventually became confident of their own skills and now undertake tunneling work themselves 
(Yoder 1983). 
The Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo, as do most locally managed systems, have leadership roles 
for directing operation and maintenance activities. These roles require leadership skills and a 
thorough knowledge of  the rules being  used, along with  experience with operation and 
maintenance. Recordkeeping is another important role in both  systems. In many  locally 
managed systems, records are kept by the system leader. Another common role in Nepal is 
monitoring of the diversion and main canal. This is a way to make timely repairs before serious 
breaching occurs and to provide early detection of  other problems that require immediate 
attention. 
The richness of  special roles for irrigation management developed around the world is 
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irrigation management in the Petanu and 00  river basins in Bali, Indonesia. They establish a 
cropping calendar that helps balance a large and delicate ecosystem. Within the watershed 
below the volcano where the supreme water temple for the watershed is located, new irrigation 
systems are only initiated after the approval and blessing of the High Priest. 
SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES 
Decision Making 
The constitution of the Raj Kulo System calls for two meetings a year for conducting routine 
business. One is just before the rainy  season to report on the work completed on canal 
maintenance and review the status of the accounts. Additional agenda often include modifi- 
cation of rules, such as the rate of fines  for being absent from work. The second meeting takes 
place after the rice harvest to plan repairs and improvements necessary for the canal. Fines, 
for having missed work, are announced  at the meeting and all members are instructed to pay 
the secretary. At  times, business cannot be  completed on the first day  and the meeting 
continues for one or more days until all of the agenda has been covered. 
Extra meetings  are called whenever  the. need  arises.  Usually,  this  relates to  canal 
improvement activities or financial matters. In  1982, there was  a series of  intense daily 
meetings for nearly a week while the Raj Kulo irrigators tried to decide if they should allow 
irrigation to be allocated to additional fields to expand the system. The proposal was to sell 
water shares to individuals and invest the income as an endowment for the local high school. 
Since there was no  agreement among the members, the matter was dropped when government 
support for the high school was announced. 
Members are required to attend all regular meetings and must pay a fine equivalent to a 
day of maintenance labor if they are absent without justification. A quorum of  at least 50 
percent of the members is required for the organization to make binding decisions.  A respected 
member is usually requested to chair meetings and a second person appointed to take minutes. 
A list of  agenda items is prepared but issues which become necessary are added during 
discussion. Formal resolutions are drafted and presented by any individual concerned about 
a particular issue. After an issue is introduced the chairman allows open discussion. Often, 
time is given for members to break into informal groups for discussion as well. When the 
chairman feels there has been adequate discussion he asks all in agreement to approve by 
clapping. If the response  is not ovenvbelming, more discussion is allowed. Only infrequently 
has there been a call for more formal voting. The secretary for the meeting records all 
resolutions in a register book.  Before the close of  the meeting the resolutions are read aloud 
and the book is passed for all members present to sign. 
There is an annual election of canal officials who form a canal committee. If the chairman 
or secretary is found to be negligent of his duties he can be removed at any time by a two-thirds 
majority vote. The canal committee is empowered to formulate operating rules in the cases 70  CHAF'ER  7 
of natural calamity, when there is no possibility of  a general meeting being held immediately. 
These rules must later be approved at a general meeting. 
The Chhattis Mauja System also uses annual meetings to form and modify rules and elect 
officials. Irrigators vote indirectly at these meetings through the representatives appointed 
from each branch canal. The elected officials, together with one person appointed by each of 
the nine area-level committees, form an executive committee. The system chairman exercises 
a great deal of authority in system operation but defers to the full executive committee for all 
controversial  decisions.  There is sufficient criticism  of maintenance expenditure  at the general 
assembly meetings to cause the executive committee officials to exercise care in the use of 
their authority. Minutes of meetings give numerous examples where decisions were deferred 
to a general assembly meeting to avoid criticism. This allows full discussion since all irrigators 
are free to attend the meetings; however, only the appointed representatives vote. 
In the examples reviewed, irrigators find it important to provide all members with an 
opportunity to meet regularly to discuss  problems, approve plans, and determine  policies. This 
allows sharing of information and makes it easier to hold leaders accountable. However, it is 
difficult for a large body to exercise responsibility. There are committees in addition to an 
assembly resulting in combining the strengths and compensating for the weaknesses of each 
mode of decision making. 
Uphoff  (1986) concluded his discussion of  membership and  decision making in an 
irrigation organization with the observation that the strucNre of decision making and the way 
members become involved in it are important design features. His studies of  local rural 
organizations other than those that are irrigation-related, confirmed that the best structure is 
one with an assembly of all members who meet periodically, supplemented by one or more 
committees.  possibly an executive committee, which can exercise more direct and active 
leadership. 
Accounting 
Accounting is a tool used for monitoring transactions of cash, labor, skills, and materials - 
the resources most frequently mobilized. Accounts do not necessarily need to be written but 
they must be acceptable to those who hold the charter of  authority of the system and they are 
usually systematic.  Practices in locally managed systems range from not keeping any  accounts 
to detailed written records requiring verifiable signatures. 
In the water-scarce, though easily maintained, Thambesi Kulo System in Nepal, there 
have never been cash transactions and the irrigators keep no written records. The irrigators 
meet just prior to planting the rainy season rice crop and work together to clean the canal. 
They note which families using irrigation are not participating in the work and send someone 
to visit their maize field to harvest a snack for those working. The group monitors compliance 
or noncompliance to the request for labor to clean the canal and extracts payment, without a 
written account, from families that miss work. 
In the Thulo Kulo in Chherlung several types of  written records are kept. These are 
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Themostimportantrecordsareworkattendancerecords.Distinctionismadebetweenrequests 
for labor for emergency and routine maintenance  since  the charge for absenteeism is different. 
Detailed accounts are also kept of all financial transactions. 
The water-powered grain mill that the Thulo Kulo canal organization owns and operates 
is accounted for separately. For the first six years of operation, the mill was managed directly 
by the organization. They rotated responsibility for attending the mill and recording income 
and expenses on  a daily basis. Presently. the mill is managed by a single member who has a 
contract for its operation and pays a fixed annual fee to the canal organization. The contract 
is awarded through competitive bidding. 
In the Thulo Kulo, the written records of individual water share ownership and the basis 
for irrigation allocation, have several minor discrepancies. These have come about because 
of sloppy recording of share transactions among members. The adjacent Tallo Kulo with a 
similar transferable shares arrangement adopted a formal registration of shares, including 
certificates for individual families that detail their irrigation shares. A water share transaction 
in the Tallo Kulo requires four separate record entries. Entries must be made on  both the 
seller’s and the buyer’s  certificates. In the system leader’s register the shares transacted are 
deducted  from the share account of the seller and added to the account of the buyer. The system 
leader and the buyer both sign the seller’s certificate and the leader and seller sign the buyer’s 
certificate to verify each change (Yoder 1983). 
In the Raj Kulo of Palpa it is customary for the system members to call for an audit of the 
secretary’s financial records. At the annual general meeting, a committee composed of 
irrigators is appointed and commissioned to examine all the records and verify the accuracy 
of the annual financial  report. Care is exercised to select competent persons who represent 
different group interests among the members. In this way, the person keeping the accounts 
cannot easily form an alliance and defraud the pp.  The intent is to dispel any hint of 
wrongdoing by opening all accounts and records to public scrutiny. 
Communication 
Successful irrigation operation requires that farmers have information about the current Status 
of the irrigation supply and that they are informed about future prospects. Effective system 
management requires a two-way flow of information among the operational  staff  and between 
the staff  and irrigators. Communication is greatly simplified in locally managed systems 
because the staff are generally irrigators as well. However, the invesaent made by locally 
managed irrigation systems in setting up channels of communication highlights the impor- 
tance irrigators place on an adequate flow of information. 
In the 3,500-ha Chhattis Mauja System, 47 of the approximately 100 elected and hired 
persons holding functional roles in the four main levels of  organization are designated as 
messengers (Yoder forthcoming). Messengers are responsible for the formal flow of informa- 
tion.  Decisions at meetings that affect operation or maintenance are communicated via the 
messengers to the leaders of  branch canals and again within branches by  other part-time 
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date and time of delivery along with the signature of the person receiving the message. This 
is a practice that developed after several unfortunate episodes of  failed communication 
resulting in inconvenience to a great number of irrigators. 
The three full-time messengers at the joint-system and system levels are provided with 
bicycles, bags to carry letters, register books, raincoats, and torchlights to he able to carry out 
their duties day or night. At the branch canal level the messenger’s job usually includes 
informing all irrigators of a call for emergency repairs. A common practice is to ride a bicycle 
through the village at  dusk as farmers arrive home from the fields shouting the message as 
they go. Most of the 44  branch canal messengers are employed only part of the year. 
Farmers generally go to the village-level leader when they have a problem such as water 
scarcity, or a conflict with labor or irrigation delivery schedules, etc. They are also to contact 
the village-level leader when they have complaints about main system management. He in 
turn is then  responsible for informing someone in  the executive committee. Frequently. 
farmers bypass all middle levels and communicate their concerns directly to a member of the 
executive committee. Ultimately, the matter is brought to the attention of the chairman who 
calls either the manager or the messenger to verify the information and takes corrective action. 
In  hill systems in Nepal, various methods, from criers to bugle blowers, are used to 
communicate a call for assembly or emergency work on the irrigation system (Yoder 1986. 
Gurung 1989). However, most hill systems are small enough to allow easy communication 
without employing special messengers, provided the irrigators are resident near each other 
and their irrigated fields. Special arrangements are often made when fanners live on hilltops 
and their fields are some hours’ walk in the valley below. 
Staff employed  to patrol the Thulo Kulo Canal in Chherlung are responsible for informing 
the system leader when here is need to take maintenance action. For farmers in the mutual 
companies of Colorado, the ditchrider is a channel of information flow about system status. 
While purchasing water in the market, farmers in Alicante depend on ditchriders  for informa- 
tion on expected irrigation delivery. 
Successful locally managed irrigation systems have recognized the need for effective 
communication. Though many of the Colorado mutual irrigation companies have few lined 
canals and use simple gates, their communication system is highly developed. Each irrigator 
is linked by telephone to his company office and to each other. Rapid, low-cost communication 
makes it easy to order and monitor imgation delivery. In most developing countries, reliable 
telecommunication facilities  are not available in rural areas and messages are communicated 
from person to person. Tea shops and other local gathering points provide important oppor- 
tunities for sharing information. Individuals are often designated to carry messages and are 
given well-defined guidelines for accomplishing their missions. 
Setting up a communication network is not likely to be the largest problem that will be 
encountered in  management transfer and turnover projects. It  may  be  more  difficult to 
establish an atmosphere of  openness for sharing information. Trust and goodwill must be 
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Conflict Management 
Conflicts are inevitable in irrigation and some conflicts are never resolved. However, if there 
is no way of  managing minor as well as serious disagreements, disaster is likely to result. 
Irrigators of locally managed irrigation systems have managed conflict by using a variety of 
alternative institutions and procedures. When any one combination of methods has appeared 
to threaten local usage and control, they typically switch to another. 
Most conflicts involve two parties. Any party or institution not involved in the substance 
of  the conflict but that enters it in order to help resolve it is called a third party. Maass and 
Anderson (1978) provide a useful description of different modes of conflict management. A 
conflict can be resolved by avoidance by one of the parties, coercion by one of the parties, or 
negotiation involving both parties. Avoidance occurs when one party takes no action even 
though its interests were violated. The tactic is to cause the other party to make amends. By 
coercion one party imposes the outcome on the other, typically by a threat or the use of force 
until the other party  concedes.  In  negotiation, both  parties  seek a  mutually  acceptable 
settlement without the intervention of a third party. Negotiation is more likely to succeed 
between allies than between adversaries. 
All  of  these methods are used by  locally managed systems. Uijwal  Pradhan (1988) 
describes a series of conflicts among three communities over access to irrigation in the Tallo 
Kulo in Chherlung. The initial conflict was between only two communities and negotiation 
resulted in an  agreement between them that was acceptable. Afterward, a third community 
was successful in attracting funds from the government to assist in extending the canal to its 
fields. The canal extension was completed before.an agreement was reached on allocating the 
imgation  supply  among tbe  three communities and the new  irrigators insisted  that  the 
government  should  intervene  and  arbitrate the  dispute. However, the first communities 
resisted. arguing that they had made considerable prior investment. They further insisted that 
since all parties would need to work together to manage the canal they should negotiate the 
agreement without third-party interference.  It took numerous meetings over a five-year period 
for a settlement to be reached hut working arrangements are now satisfactory to all parties. 
Ditchriders often discover infractions by  fanners but  use avoidance to manage the 
problem. In the Chherlung Thulo Kulo, for example, when the person hired to patrol the canal 
finds an illegal outlet as a poorly disguised crab hole, he may choose not to confront the farmer 
directly and instead close the hole in a manner that makes it clear that he recognized that water 
was being stolen. If the problem persists he may make a reference about an increasing  problem 
with people stealing water to a group of farmers when the offender is present. Usually, without 
confrontation, he can get farmers to stop stealing water. However, if necessary, he can call on 
the full organization to take action and will then recount all the occasions when he had to plug 
the holes made by the farmer. The organization’s rules state that a fine must be. paid and that 
if the problem continues, the sanction will increase with ultimate refusal by the organization 
to give the offender water. Graduated sanctions for illegally taking water are common in many 
systems (Ostrom 1992). 
There are  many examples where irrigators in systems with diversions in proximity on the 
same stream dispute the available supply. In many cases, coercion is used. The farmers of the 14  CHAPTER  7 
lower system break the diversion of the upper system to release water downstream. Sometimes 
the problem persists year after year. In other cases, resolution is sought in courts of law with 
varying  success in  different countries. A case in  Bali  mentioned  by  Bellekens (1992) 
negotiated a settlement after a new concrete weir was constructed. They converted the flush 
gate into a proportional divider to deliver the agreed upon fraction of the river flow to the 
lower system. 
Early (1990) reports that conflict management occurs at  numerous levels within the 
mutual companies in Colorado. The ditchrider interfaces with the fanners and may intervene 
when two fanners have problems that relate to the supply they receive at the same time. In 
many cases, the ditcbrider prefers to err on the high side in water delivery to eliminate a 
perceived shortage rather than involve company management because it would indicate he 
has not  managed to take care of  a problem on his own. Discussion of  water supply and 
allocation at the regular monthly meetings can head off  or directly address many  of  the 
conflicts that would arise otherwise. 
Institutions  in locally managed systems evolve in response to conflicts. It is a slow process 
but one that generally reflects the cultural values and norms of the community. Programs for 
assisting locally managed systems should put greater effort into identifying and understanding 
these institutions and utilize the mechanism they provide for conflict management. 
REASONS FOR IRRIGATORS TO ORGANIZE 
Hill  Systems in Nepal 
Locally  managed irrigation  systems exhibit a diversity of  organizational structures and 
varying degrees of  formality of  structure. Martin and Yoder (1988) examined eight systems 
in the hills of Nepal to determine the most likely cause or purpose for irrigators to organize 
themselves and the reason for variation in their organizational structure. The indicators they 
used to rank the level and formality of the organizational structure  included: designated roles, 
meetings, number of different written records, and sanctions. 
One hypothesis tested was that the management organization of systems with a scarce 
water supply would be more structured than that of  systems in which the water supply was 
relatively abundant. Downing (1974) refers to this as the “excess scarcity hypothesis.” The 
hypothesis is “scarce water equals more conflicts equals more social control.’’ It was con- 
cluded that the established water rights, not the organizational structure, enabled irrigators to 
limit access to the irrigation supply. While the organizational structure enabled enforcement 
of the water rights, factors other than water scarcity were more influential in determining the 
nature of the structure in this hill environment. 
Another hypothesis investigated was that the relationship of management intensity and 
formal organizational structure to  the relative water  supply is described by  an inverted 
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increased  management effort through  a  stronger organization is  either unproductive or 
unnecessary. The maximum returns to, and thus incentives for. organized group activity are 
in cases of intermediate water supply levels. This type of community response function was 
suggested by  Uphoff, Wickramasinghe and Wijayaratna (1981) in analyzing incentives for 
fanners’ participation in irrigation system management. Results of the study in Nepal showed 
reasonable correlation in systems where water was scarce but not in those where water was 
abundant or at an intermediate level. 
Martin and Ycder also examined the argument that systems irrigating only a small part 
of  the command area with a relatively high irrigation supply would need to have a strong 
organization to be able to restrict access to the water. A high degree of formal organizational 
structure would be necessary to keep irrigators from expanding the area they irrigate or from 
selling water to their neighbors. This hypothesis was also rejected. Strong institutions  of water 
rights, open access for irrigation except for the rice season, and the fact that the relatively 
abundant  supply is only  a recent phenomenon were  reasons given. The well-developed 
organizational  structure  enabled the formation and implementation of access rules but as  noted 
above, other factors tended to be more important in shaping the nature of the organizational 
structure in this particular environment. 
Size, especially  the number  of  members, would  Seem  to  be  an  important  variable 
explaining the level  of  organizational  structure. Organizational theory  suggests that, in 
general, an organization with a large number of members will be more formally structured 
than one with fewer members. While this may contribute to the level of formal organizational 
structure, it did not explain much of the variation in formality observed among the systems 
studied. 
Implicit in the hypothesis  that the degree of organizational structure  is inversely correlated 
with the water supply is the assumption that the organization is structured primarily for 
distribution of water. This may be true of fanner organizations  within large irrigation systems 
which are jointly managed by an irrigation agency and fanner  organizations. The agency may 
carry out all activities, including maintenance, required to deliver water to a certain level 
within the system where it becomes the responsibility of the water users’ organization to 
distribute it among the fields. 
In locally managed surface systems diverting water from streams, activities other than 
irrigation distribution often determine the organizational structure. Martin and Yoder (1988) 
concluded that mobilization of labor for maintenance, a dominant activity in the hill environ- 
ment of Nepal, was most influential. The greater the amount of labor mobilized to maintain 
the headworks and main canal to capture and convey water to the command area, the more 
highly structured and formal was the organization. This was found to be true irrespective of 
the amount of imgation supply available. In the environment of streams with high floods in 
the rainy season and unstable hill slopes, organization to maintain the system for water 
acquisition -  getting the water to the command area -  is more important than distribution 
of  the  irrigation  supply among the users.  As  mentioned below, strong organization for 
irrigation acquisition also has a positive influence on distribution. 
The amounts of labor per hectare and labor per member were examined as  possible scale 
variables to correlate with the organizational structure. Neither predicted the level of formal 16  CHAPTER  7 
organizational structure nor the total laborrequirement in the eight sample systems, although 
both gave better rankings than the other variables tested (Martin and Ycder 1988). 
Analysis of Resource Mobilization and Organizational Structure 
If  members of  an  irrigation organization must invest a significant amount of  labor, and 
sometimes cash, in order to acquire water, they want to be sure that each one who benefits 
contributes  his fair share. Hence, organizations that mobilize a large amount of resources tend 
to keep written attendance records, enforce sanctions for missing work, and audit accounts. 
The organizations’ rules and minutes of meetings tend to focus on the issues surrounding the 
mobilization of resources, e.g., how much labor and cash members must contribute, the tines 
for not attending to work, and circumstances under which one is excused from work. The main 
functions of the elected officers are to organize and supervise the maintenance work on the 
system, keep accurate records of members’ contributions, and enforce sanctions for failing to 
contribute as required. This is the case in the Raj Kulo in Argali and the Thulo Kulo of 
Chherlung where the canals are from two to six kilometers long, requiring many man-days of 
labor for maintenance prior to and during the important rice growing period in the monsmn 
season. 
On the other hand, the Thambesi Kulo has a main canal that is less than 200 meters long 
:md can be cleaned in one day with only a few members working. This has resulted in an 
organization that has little concern with keeping an accurate record of members’ contributions 
or for enforcing proportional contribution by all members. The Thambesi Kulo organization 
does not keep records of members’ attendance at work, imposes minimal sanctions for being 
absent, maintains no written rules nor minutes of  meetings, and keeps no accounts. The 
organization has no elected officers or designated functionaries. 
The irrigation organizations in the Raj Kulo and the Thulo Kulo have, in recent years, 
assessed cash contributions per irrigation share to make improvements to their intakes and 
main canals. Keeping account of the contributions and expenditures also requires a more 
formal organizational structure. The Thambesi Kulo organization has never raised any cash 
from its members. 
System Performance 
There is a relationship between the need  to mobilize resources to acquire water and the 
effectiveness of the distribution of water. Lewis (1971) compared two systems in the hills of 
Ilocos Norte in the Philippines. One required a great deal of maintenance (40  to 60 work days 
per member annually).  Fines for absence from work were enforced and repeat offenders were 
denied water. In the year Lewis observed the system, there were few absences, all fines were 
paid, and the members were satisfied that they were receiving the water to which they were 
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regularly  failed to  appear for contribution of  labor, and  fines  against them  were often 
impossible to collect (Lewis 1971). Members in the tail area of this system complained of 
inequitable distribution; several who often did not receive irrigation dropped out of  the 
organization. 
Similar results were seen in the systems studied in Nepal. In systems requiring mobiliza- 
tion of large amounts of labor for maintenance. the distribution of water coincided more with 
the irrigation allocation than in systems requiring little effort in water acquisition. In the Thulo 
Kulo and Raj Kulo, irrigation distribution matched the irrigation allocation remarkably well 
and waterstress whenitoccurredwasnot  attributedtoinappmpriateimgation  delivery (Yoder 
1986). 
The organizations in Argali and Chherlung required the resources of all the members to 
acquire the water. The fanners at the head of the system could not take all the water and deny 
the tail-end farmers their share because they were dependent on the assistance of all fanners 
in maintaining the system. This interdependence among the fanners in systems requiring a 
high  level of  resource mobilization is a key  factor affecting the equitable and efficient 
operation of the system.  Where few resources are needed to keep the irrigation supply flowing, 
the farmers at the head end can do  the work by themselves and are less concerned with keeping 
the tail-end farmers satisfied. 
Effective organization is more difficult to maintain in a system where irrigation distribu- 
tion rather than water acquisition is the primary activity. Fanners in a system all face the same 
incentives for water acquisition but not for distribution. When water is scarce the fanners at 
the head end have an incentive to break the rules and take more than their allotted share. 
However, if they are dependent on the tail-end farmers for assistance with irrigation acquisi- 
tion, it is easier for the organization to enforce equitable irrigation distribution. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSISTING LOCALLY MANAGED SYSTEMS 
In the preceding chapters it was proposed that assistance to locally managed systems should 
be channeled through their existing organizations. If an organization is strong there are few 
obstacles. If it is weak it was proposed that the assistance activity should be used to strengthen 
the institutions essential for continued operation and maintenance. This implies two assump- 
tions: first that there is a way to determine the viability of the organization and second that 
methods exist for enabling weak organizations to take increased responsibility. 
Identifying the Existing Rules and Organizational Structure 
Evaluation of an irrigation organization is complicated by the enormous diversity possible in 
the formulation of institutions. As seen in the examples from Valencia and Alicante, in two 
irrigation communities in Eastern Spain in  a similar physical setting and  with  the same 
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useful approach for determining how irrigators organize and what rules they use to conduct 
their business is to first determine the irrigation-related activities carried out each season of 
the year and then  to formulate questions that elicit how the inigators accomplish those 
activities. 
Reyes and Borlagdan (1981) prepd  an interview guide for their work with communal 
irrigation systems in the Philippines. It provides a good outline of  many basic questions 
regarding the operation of irrigation systems. Rapid rural appraisal procedures have been used 
in  many  countries to explore organizational issues. Yoder and Martin (1985)  prepared a 
question guide for investigating irrigation systems in Nepal that have been ukd for rapid 
appraisal of systems. A more recent innovation, used primarily to explore rain-fed agriculture 
but which could be adapted for use in irrigation projects, is participatory rural appraisal (PRA). 
PRA is a process of enabling a group, like an irrigator’s organization, to provide information 
on a selected topic (Chambers 1992). The topic could be the operation of the group’s irrigation 
system. Villagers are encouraged to use any media that are comfortable -  usually locally 
available items such as grain, stones, baskets, the entire floor of a court yard, etc., rather than 
paper  and  pencil -  to create models, illustrated lists, or any  other  aids  that help them 
communicate the information about the topic. 
Strengthening Weak Organizations 
Change in an organization. in the rules used  and how business is done, must usually come 
from within to be sustainable. An  assistance project can help a group identify its underlying 
problems and make suggestions for overcoming them but the will to implement change must 
come from the group. Incentives must be  sufficient to attract participation of  all involved. 
These can be social, economic, or simply convenience but the reason for change must provide 
enough benefit to make it worth the effort and cost. 
Farmer-to-farmer training visits have proven beneficial in initiating changes in organiza- 
tion and operational rules (N. Pradhan and Yoder 1989).  Groups of farmers from a system 
receiving improvements were taken on  a tour to other locally managed irrigation systems. 
Farmers from the systems being visited were proud to show visitors their system and explain 
how  it  was  operated and  maintained.  A  facilitator asked  questions  when  necessary  to 
encourage an exchange that also identified the rules being used and  how  sanctions were 
applied. 
By visiting a number of irrigation systems that had used different approaches to overcome 
problems similar to those faced by the visitors in their own system. discussion was stimulated 
about available options. Farmers exchanging information with other farmers is an effective 
training mode because of their similar backgrounds and interests. The necessary level of trust 
can be reached quickly and extended discussions take place that reveal weaknesses as well as 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT TRANSFER AND TURNOVER 
Membership is important in most locally managed systems because it identities the legitimate 
body of decision makers and its source of authority. In the Raj Kulo of Nepal this was evident 
in an irrigation meeting which took place the day following a local government election. 
Opponents in the bitterly contested election, who were both members of the system, stated 
publicly that the issues of the irrigation meeting had nothing to do with politics. The authority 
for the decisions they were about to make regarding irrigation came from those assembled, 
not from the government. Since the operation of the irrigation system concerned all of their 
livelihoods they were putting aside politics and  working together to maintain the system 
(Yoder 1983). 
The Thambesi Kulo, without a well-defined membership, is in an interesting and revealing 
category of locally managed systems.  Acquiring and delivering irrigation is easy and control- 
led by those with fields in the most advantageous geographical location. Decisions are not 
made collectively so there is little need for a structure or rules for decision making. This is 
analogous to the lower levels of most agency-managed systems where the agency supplies 
irrigation to the headgate of the unit. Farmers with fields near the headgate have first access 
to the irrigation supply. There is often little interdependence among the farmers receiving 
water from the common headgate. They do not need to work together to acquire water from 
the source or to maintain the main canal. Fanners in disadvantaged locations relative to the 
headgate have little means for influencing irrigation distribution. Membership and organiza- 
tion for decision making have less meaning in such a situation. 
This has serious implications  for management transfer efforts where the agency continues 
to maintain the acquisition and main canal facilities. While this certainly does not mean that 
all management transfer projects will fail to stimulate stronger user organization, it does mean 
that a major unifying factor found in locally managed systems is lacking and something else 
must be substituted in its place. 
Locally managed systems that are given assistance and systems that are turned over must 
continue maintenance and water acquisition activities. An organizational structure  can be built 
around the needs of these activities. Ways must be explored for giving irrigators responsibility 
for activities that require them to depend on each other in systems where management transfer 
takes place. As noted by Coward and Uphoff (1986) this is not likely to happen unless farmers 
are also given a voice in activities of  acquiring, allocating, and distributing the irrigation 
supply. CHAPTER 8 
Summary and Implications for Assistance, 
Turnover and Management Transfer Programs 
IRRIGATORS  PACE  A set of physical conditions that bring uncertainty to their task of delivering 
water to individual fields in a timely fashion. Unregulated stream flows are highly variable 
both seasonally and from year to year. The simple fact that water flows makes its status, at a 
particular location and paint in time, dependent on what has happened upstream -  in the 
watershed, along the canal, or elsewhere in the groundwater basin. Uncertainty brings a level 
of  insecurity that influences relations among a group of irrigators. 
A powerful conclusion that emerges from the examination of selected locally managed 
irrigation systems is theextent to whichirrigators havecontrolledtheirowndestiny asfanners. 
They have accomplished this in  the face of  uncertainty and insecurity. Local control bas 
enabled irrigators to act collectively in establishing rules and procedures for acquiring and 
distributing  a limited and highly variable irrigation supply among themselves. The institutions 
they created have been tailored by trial and error to meet their needs. In the competition for 
use of the water resources, they have successfully managed conflicts arising within and among 
groups. They have been successful in paying for operation and maintenance that accompany 
independence in  system governance. They  have  sustained, even  improved, systems by 
supplying labor, materials, cash and knowledge when needed. 
However, descriptions of Locally managed systems available in the literature are generally 
not representative of all systems in an area. They have been selected for study because of 
features that stand out -  a perennial water supply, successful maintenance activities, or a 
unique irrigation distribution procedure -  rather than by random sampling of  all systems. 
Studies tend to choose systems that represent above-average performance of the charac- 
teristics being investigated. This is valuable in identifying viable management options and 
models to emulate, and helps establish the upper boundary of local management potential but 
should not be construed as the norm. 
For many different reasons -loss  of effective leadership, change in economic environ- 
ment, or occurrence of natural calamities -  some systems have lost the ability to sustain their 
performance. Others are still struggling to achieve successful and sustained operation. These 
are the ones that assistance programs need to identify. The final section of  this chapter 
discusses possible strategies  for identifying and supporting  systems  that canbenefit most from 
assistance. The following section reviews some of  the characteristics that emerge from the 
study of successful locally managed systems. 
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CHARACTERISTICS  OF  SUCCESSFUL  LOCALLY  MANAGED 
SYSTEMS 
If  longevity is a reliable indicator of  success, many  locally managed systems are highly 
successful. A more precise measure of system performance would be to compare the irrigation 
delivery with the irrigator’s expectations as identified in their allocation rules. Few studies 
have made systematic irrigation delivery measurements in  locally managed systems. Most 
studies dwell on  and give high marks to the performance of  process measures. These are 
measures relating to the system’s internal operations and procedures. They deal with irrigation 
allocation, resource mobilization, and the many supporting activities that transform the inputs 
of water, management, labor, and physical facilities, into the system’s  many intermediate and 
final outputs (Small and Svendsen 1992). The following paragraphs summarize some of the 
observations and impressions made from examining how locally managed systems accom- 
plish their many tasks. Local control is the dominant influence in the success of these activities. 
Interrelationship between Construction and Management 
An important consequence of irrigators being responsible for the construction and improve- 
ment process is the contribution of this exercise to building institutions. In the process of 
meeting to discuss and plan  the construction, irrigators also define the structure of their 
organization, learn to make decisions as a group, define roles, handle conflicts, and establish 
procedures for keeping records. Leaders who demonstrate that they are capable and trustwor- 
thy during construction are often assigned leadership positions in managing the operation and 
maintenance activities. Possibly most important, rules are developed for mobilizing contribu- 
tions from members. The key element to the success in continuing to mobilize labor and other 
resources for maintenance is the perception that responsibility for the contributions is divided 
equitably among all who share the benefits of the system. 
Ownership and Membership 
Ownership  of the hydraulic and physical property develops for those who construct the system 
and subsequently maintain it. This gives them a socially recognized right to receive water 
from the system and a recognized responsibility to help with its operation and maintenance. 
After construction of both the Subak Gunung and Tulo Kulo systems irrigation shares were 
allocated only to the persons who had contributed to their construction. Now both systems 
allow others to become members by  purchasing shares, thus compensating directly and 
indirectly those who invested labor for constructing the system. 
System membership is generally defined by  the irrigation allocation rules. Where the 
allocation is proportional sharing, irrespective of the basis for sharing, it generally defines 
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priority of who first accessed the source, membership is less defined. Membership determines 
who has the authority to create and confirm the rules and procedures that shape the system. 
Security of the Irrigation Supply 
The limits to which irrigation can be delivered are generally spelled out by  the irrigation 
allocation rules. Irrigation allocation by shares requires membership rules or other criteria to 
limit growth and provide security of  access to the water. When location of land or ‘Krst in 
time” allocation rules are used, system expansion is automatically limited. This gives security 
to those who have the first right to use water. Those who join the system later only receive 
water after those with the first rights take all they need. 
The right to continue using the source of water, as well as the knowledge that the system 
cannot be expanded without consideration for irrigation adequacy, are important factors in 
determining future participation and investment in the system. The Thulo Kulo members 
agreed to allow a 25 percent increase in the area irrigated after determining that the income 
from the sale of shares was sufficient to increase the canal capacity, thus ensuring adequate 
delivery. The Siran Tar Kulo example illustrates the difficulty when  water rights are not 
secure. Many individuals  who had contributed to the original construction of the canal did not 
receive irrigation and refused to participate in further investment in the system. 
Strong Organization 
Organizational structures are determined by  many factors. In Nepal, it was found that the 
greater the amount of labor necessary to maintain the system the more highly structured and 
formal was  the organization. In  Valencia, a strong irrigation organization is required to 
distribute irrigation during periods of  severe drought when the allocation is shifted from 
proportional shares according to landownership to a crop-priority basis. In Alicante, the water 
market automatically adjusts for drought conditions but a strong organization is necessary for 
operating the water market. 
Having full authority vested with the system members makes it possible for the organi- 
zation to modify its rules and adapt its procedures to changing conditions. This gives them 
the opportunity to test specific solutions to problems and tailor their institutions, over time, 
to best meet their needs in ways that match local conditions and resources. 
Representation 
A cofhmon characteristic of almost all locally managed systems is that virtually all imgators 
have a voice in making decisions. In smaller systems, decisions are often made in a general 
meeting of all members. In the Raj Kulo, a general meeting is treated like a day of  routine 84  CHAPTER  8 
maintenance and all members are required to attend. A fine must be paid by all who are  absent. 
The  attendance rule  ensures that  decisions have  strong member support thus  reducing 
complaints and conflict. Larger systems use representatives to vote on important issues. The 
lowest organizational levels in the Chhattis Mauja collectively appoint their representatives 
to the general assembly meeting. Only the appointed representatives vote for the officers of 
the executive committee. 
Monitoring 
Irrigators in most locally managed irrigation systems know exactly how much of the available 
irrigation supply they are to receive and the timing of  the expected delivery if it is not on a 
continuous basis. The ability of individual farmers to monitor the compliance of irrigation 
delivery to their entitlement is an important factor in the success of these systems.  At the field 
canal level irrigators monitor the distribution individually. At higher levels they may take 
turns checking that the planned irrigation supply is being delivered from the main canal 
through the network into the fieldchannel. Fixedpmportionaldividingstructures  arepreferred 
by many irrigators when conditions are favorable for their use because it is easy to monitor 
irrigation delivery in such a network. 
Monitoring resource contributions of each member is done in most systems. Attendance 
records of  mandatory work  sessions and  accounts of  cash transactions are generally the 
responsibility of appointed or elected officials. However, these records are generally open for 
public inspection at all times. Equitable sharing of the operation and maintenance cost, as well 
as the benefits reduces conflicts and raises the level of trust and cooperation. 
Resource Mobilization 
An outstanding  characteristic  of successful locally managed systems is the ability tocontribute 
labor and other essential resources to keep systems maintained and operating. The emphasis 
is on making structures functional and durable but at the lowest possible cost. Coward and 
Martin (1986) reported that the value of  resources mobilized in a number of locally managed 
systems in Nepal, the Philippines, and India (Tamil Nadu) were all substantially higher than 
the fees collected from farmers in most irrigation systems managed by government irrigation 
agencies in the same countries. 
Communication 
There is generally an open atmosphere for sharing information in locally managed systems. 
This is essential for the level of  cooperation necessary for effective system operation and 
maintenance. Most meetings are open to all members, not only to receive input but also to CHAPTER8  85 
facilitate communication. In larger systems and where members do not all live in proximity, 
persons  are often hired  as messengers to deliver instructions reliably and on time. The 
temporary nature of structures and often difficult terrain make many systems vulnerable to 
failure. Effective monitoring and rapid communication enable timely response to emergen- 
cies. 
Accountability 
Most employees and appointed officials of locally managed systems are also irrigators and 
long-term members of  the community. There is social pressure upon them to do their work 
honestly. Terms of officials are kept short, generally not more than one or two years, so that 
persons who do not perform well can be removed at the end of their normal term without 
being disgraced. In many  systems, officials are reappointed many  times if  their work is 
satisfactory. Most systems can terminate officials immediately for fraudulent behavior. Local 
control over the appointment of officials makes it easy to hold them accountable for their 
actions. 
Accounts and Records 
Many small systems do not keep written accounts. If shirking and free riding take place all 
members are generally aware of  them and can take collective action. In larger systems, 
especially where considerable  resources are used for maintenance each year, written accounts 
are kept. Labor attendance and financial accounts are the most common records kept. The 
accounts are  typically checked by an audit committee appointed by the members and reports 
are  given to the members at meetings. Having the records and accounts available for inspection 
by all members is an important characteristic that builds trust. 
Conflict and  Sanctions 
Successful locally managed systems generally have rules to control shirking and free riding. 
If water is taken out of turn or from an illegal outlet, graduated sanctions are applied that take 
into account the extent and damage caused by the infraction. Verbal warnings at meetings 
called specifically to deal with an infraction and other forms of public disclosure put strong 
social pressure on members living in proximity to each other. The nature of  the conflict 
determines options for managing it. Most conflicts among members are handled internally. 
However, it is not unusual for authorities from the local government to be asked to intervene 
in disputes among systems. 86  CHAPTER 8 
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR  TURNOVER  AND 
MANAGEMENT TRANSFER 
Understanding the characteristics  of successful systems is important in outlining what systems 
that  are turned over to the local  management will  need  to  look  like. While the same 
characteristics are important for agency systems where management transfer is to take place, 
the form they take may be somewhat different than in locally managed systems. 
Turnover Programs 
Farmer-to-farmer training visits are an effective method of introducing irrigators to the new 
tasks that they will need to perform when the system is turned over to them. During these 
visits fanners are often surprised at the amount of work required for effective maintenance 
but  excited  about the  power  they  sense in  a well-organized group (N.  Pradhan  1987). 
Observing differences in agricultural practices among systems is another important part of 
the training visits. The desire to increase production to the level they had witnessed in systems 
they visited was identified as one of the major incentives for changing management practices 
in systems assisted in Nepal (WECS/IIMI 1990). 
Reviewing and establishing irrigation allocation rules should be  a central issue in the 
initial discussion of  turnover and should involve all potential irrigators. Different options 
should be discussed and if possible observed in other systems. The implication of different 
rules must be clear to all irrigators. If the allocation rules give secure access to irrigation they 
will provide an incentive for increased cooperation. The rules will define the boundaries of 
the irrigated area and membership in the organization. Depending on the type of rules chosen 
and the water resources available, some farmers may need to be excluded from membership. 
Setting broad  guidelines and allowing the irrigators themselves to come to  a decision on 
allocation will improve the acceptability of the rules. 
Formulating a major rule like irrigation allocation forces the irrigators to deal with the 
process of making rules. They will need to decide how to discuss issues, prepare a motion, 
choose a voting method, and how to deal with other seemingly minor but essential  procedures. 
Discussing and setting procedures for all the irrigation tasks is a long intense process. Using 
trained irrigation organizers to facilitate this pmcess is essential, 
Turnover as a process of creating a new locally managed system will benefit from using 
construction  activities as  an  exercise to  build institutions. If  the irrigators construct the 
improvements that  are a part  of  the  turnover process it will  help create group identity. 
Requiring some level of contribution from the irrigators will increase their ownership in the 
physical  and hydraulic property. The basis  for contribution needs to  be decided and  a 
mechanism for monitoring compliance  established. Consequences for shirking responsibility 
and a means of enforcement all need to be put into place. Establishing effective patterns of 
group interaction during the constructiodimprovement phase will make enforcement during 
operation and maintenance easier. If the construction process can establish interdependence 
among irrigators from all parts of the system, it will contribute to establishing a need for equity CHAF'ER  8  87 
in system operation. With appropriate support to facilitate the process and the provision of 
essential incentives for the irrigators, turnover can be  a viable way to create new  locally 
managed systems. 
Management Transfer Programs 
Irrigation management transfer as a method for improving system management has a number 
of positive options. Because the management interface between the agency and the irrigators 
is shifted, bath the agency staff and the irrigators must modify at least some of their practices. 
This provides an opportunity for change. Establishment of a new organizational  structure and 
modification of the charter of authority are two changes that should have high priority. 
In agency-managed systems, the charter of authority in most cases is entirely with the 
agency. Decisions regarding irrigation allocation or resource mobilization are generally taken 
by the agency and dictated to the irrigators. As a strategy to increase irrigator participation in 
system management, management transfer should transfer some authority to the irrigatoa and 
give them a voice in all the affairs of the system. A shared charter of authority with the agency 
holding veto power would be one possibility. 
In larger locally managed irrigation systems, there are usually multitiered organizations 
with an executive committee at the top level. Officials at all levels are accountable to the 
irrigators either through direct election or by  representation. A system involved in manage- 
ment transfer could set up a similar organization. A hierarchical structure or a federation of 
organizations could be established with an executive committee at the main canal level. The 
executive committee could be composed of representatives from all branch canal organiza- 
tions and from the agency. 
Such a structure would establish a mechanism for information sharing, often lacking in 
agency-managed systems. Through the representative members there would be an effective 
channel for communication with all irrigators. Opening the system's accounts to the executive 
committee would allow the irrigators  to perform a monitoring role in the resource mobilization 
activity. Sharing authority to accompany their increased responsibility will be an incentive 
for irrigators to actively participate in system management. A voice in making decisions in 
operating and maintaining the main system is an incentive generally lacking in agency-man- 
aged systems. 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING LOCALLY MANAGED SYSTEMS 
Examination of  locally managed imgation systems in the field is an interesting exercise. 
Differences between  systems that  function well  and those that are having difficulty  in 
delivering water are not always readily apparent. If it is a season when water is not available 
they may look identical -  neglected and rundown. The structures may be of a similar design 
and built from the same materials, yet during at least part of the year one may be much more 88  CHAFT3R  8 
effective than the other in delivering irrigation. Differences in the less-visible components of 
the system, the rules and procedures, are possibly the only reason for differences in perform- 
ance. 
Knowledge about the characteristics of  successful locally managed systems is useful in 
the process of identifying possible reasons for differences in  performance among systems. 
First, it helps in formulating appropriate questions to probe how different essential tasks, such 
as resource mobilization or irrigation allocation, are accomplished. Second, this knowledge 
is necessary tomakeacomparative analysis. Ifdistinctionscanbemadeamongsystemsrelated 
to their level of performance, assistance can be  targeted more effectively 
Assistance Programs 
For the development of a responsible national policy and for the operation of effective support 
services at the field level, information is needed about systems operating at all levels of 
performance. A starting point is to catalog all the systems in a region by identifying their 
location and  size. Included should be information that indicates the performance of each 
system relative to its available land and water resources. This makes it possible to analyze the 
need and potential benefits from assistance. 
Diagnosing the reason as to why assistance is needed requires a higher level of informa- 
tion. This must probe beyond the symptoms of broken structures  to determine the underlying 
problems. Poor organization, ineffective rules and procedures, conflict among the irrigators, 
or conflict with competitors for the same source of water are a few of the possible problems. 
A successful assistance plan must enable the irrigators to address these problems as well as 
to improve deficient physical works. 
The level of assistance is another factor that should be carefully considered. While the 
construction component of assistance is valuable for strengthening local management, mas- 
sive improvements are counterproductive if they eliminate interdependence that routine and 
emergency maintenance needs demand among the irrigators. Minor improvements can be 
cost-effective and can stimulate the formation of stronger institutions (WECS/IIMI 1990). 
Inventory  ofallsystem,  Theprojectthat assistedtheSiranTar KuloSystem inNepal identified 
systems by conducting an inventory of the entire project area (WECS/IIMI 1990). Rivers and 
streams were systematically investigated to discover all diversion structures. Irrigators from 
each system accompanied the inventory team to the source and estimated seasonal water 
availability  in excess  of what was already diverted. Together they walked along the main canal 
and discussed operation and maintenance problems. This provided some information about 
operating rules and procedures formaintenance.  Theirrigators alsoestimated theareaimgated 
and explained the limitations to expanding it. 
The inventory identified several hundred systems in the 200 km2 project area. Over one 
hundred were in the range of size and canal length that the project considered candidates for 
assistance. The final selection of systems to be given assistance was based on the potential for CHAFTER 8  89 
expanding the irrigated area. This intensive but simple field exercise  enabled the examination 
of multiple criteria for ranking prospective systems for assistance. 
With limited resources for assisting systems, a procedure such as the inventory is useful 
both to develop an appropriate plan at the national level and to select systems eligible for 
assistance at the project level. Since the field work for collecting the information is labor-in- 
tensive, it must be designed carefully to be  manageable. Only data relating to the criteria 
considered important for policy and field-level decision making should be collected for all 
systems. For determining the type of  assistance and implementation approach, much more 
detailed information is necessary. 
Investigation ofthe need for  institutional change. Most irrigation agencies have well-defined 
procedures for developing new  irrigation  systems in  locations where irrigation  did not 
previously exist. Without existing irrigation institutions to wony about, the procedures are 
purely technical. As agency emphasis shifts to providing assistance and support senices to 
existing systems some of the procedures need to be revised. One is the method of collecting 
and analyzing information about existing institutions to determine if they need to be modified. 
A useful starting premise is that if collective action for irrigation is taking place, some 
level of organization exists. Each organization must have some level of rules and procedures 
for operating and maintaining its system. These may be rudimentary and never discussed or 
they may  be highly developed as the examples in preceding chapters have indicated. In 
addition to evaluating the physical works of the system in determining assistance needs, the 
management side must be examined to identify changes that may be necessary. A number of 
agencies and organizations have established methods for doing this. 
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in the Philippines was one of  the first 
agencies to  accommodate participation of  irrigators by  making major adjustments in its 
implementation  procedures for assisting locally managed imgation systems. The first step in 
their assistance procedure involves a technical and economic assessment by NIA technical 
staff. If  this shows that a system is a feasible candidate for assistance, socio-organizational 
data are collected by  an irrigation organizer and a socio-technical profile of the system is 
prepared. Sccio-organizational  information is collected by using a question guide. The guide 
was initially developed by researchers for the purpose of preparing irrigation case studies. It 
was modified to use as a tool for gaining an understanding about &he  irrigators’ organization 
and the rules used to accomplish operation and maintenance (Reyes 1987). 
The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in northern Pakistan is another example where 
the approach is to strengthen existing local institutions for irrigation development. This is 
done by holding a series of  dialogues with a majority of village residents in each village 
participating  in an irrigation system. This allows the irrigators to define their goals and discuss 
how they have established “fair” patterns for sharing responsibility and benefits of  irrigation. 
Through this process of  discussion, equity rules can  be challenged by  villagers and the 
underlying, often historical, reasons for water rights and resource mobilization rules can be 
confirmed (Hussein et al. 1986). 
Normally in project preparation, data are  collected in the field and taken to the offce for 
analysis. Decisions are then made without participation of the people who supplied the data 
and without the additional input they could give to fill missing gaps in information. Partici- CHAFTER 8  90 
patory rural appraisal (PRA)  is a different approach for generating information about existing 
rules and relationships and could be used in determining assistance needs in locally managed 
systems. PRA  requires that members of the assistance team go to the irrigators as students and 
facilitators rather than as collectors of data. The goal of the PRA  approach is to enable the 
irrigators to do their own investigation, cany out the analysis, share their knowledge through 
presentations, and to own the outcome. 
Visual sharing is an important part of  the PRA  approach. To learn how to share their 
information,  something  familiar is used, such as the weaving of a rice-straw mat. The irrigators 
are encouraged to demonstrate their skills and knowledge and explain the detail of each step 
in weaving the mat. Eventually, they are asked to do the same for each task that they perform 
with the irrigation system. Another medium is to have irrigators prepare a skit to dramatize 
an event such as irrigation delivery and the conflict involved. These activities allow sharing 
of  rules and relationships and feelings that are normally suppressed or missed by formal 
interviews. Enabling irrigators to share their spacial relationships by  drawing a map or by 
building a scale model of their imgation system is another important.tool of PRA.  Maps can 
be drawn on the ground and illustrated with sticks, stones, cigarette packages, seeds, etc. 
Elaborate models can be constructed using mounds of earth dug and shaped to approximate 
the topography. Groups and individuals add to and  modify the model, debating what to 
include, checking and correcting each other, and determining what is most important. The 
information is visible and public,  and  is  added to,  owned and verified  by  the imgators 
(Chambers 1992). 
Construction and institution building.  Examples from locally managed systems indicate that 
building effective institutions is a  slow  iterative process. While outside agents such as 
imgation organizers can facilitate the process, they cannot provide a blueprint that is likely 
to be adopted. Groups choose remarkably different rules and procedures to accomplish the 
same task even when they face the same local conditions. A self-governing group that is part 
of the process of developing its rules is more likely to have its members abide by them. 
Activities that require a group to grapple with making collective decisions and canying 
out  actions that require disciplined behavior are important in  the  process of institution 
building. Construction activities provide this experience and are ideal because they mirror 
many  of  the  actions required for successful system maintenance. In improving locally 
managed  systems, construction activities should be  used  as a mechanism for building 
institutions. Instead of bringing in agency staff or a contractor hired by the agency to do the 
construction, the irrigators should be required to either do the work themselves or hire a 
contractor if technical expertise beyond their capacity is required. The irrigators will remain 
the primary actors in their system if the agency staff concentrates on facilitating rather than 
executing the construction activities. 
Based on the detailed information from investigating the institutional needs, a strategy 
must be planned for enabling the irrigators to proceed with construction. The diversity in 
degree of institutional development among locally managed systems requires that the strategy 
be tailored to each system. In a case such as the Raj Kulo or Sub& Gunung. where strong 
organizations  exist that already have well-enforced rules for labor mobilization, accounting, 
etc., very lmle input may be necessary. Assuming that no changes in procedures are mandated CHAFTER 8  91 
by  the project, it may be sufficient to review the project’s conditions of quality control and 
accounting to check that all members agree to the improvement activity under those condi- 
tions. 
However, if the improvement project carries with it a stipulation that the membership 
rules be changed to allow the system to expand, additional agreement would be necessary. In 
the Raj Kulo, for example, where membership is defined by ownership of fields entitled to 
use the Eanal to irrigate rice. it would be necessary to determine that the members agree to 
allow inclusion of additional fields. All qualifying conditions should be discussed and the 
details put into writing. Discussion and agreement would also be necessary to determine how 
irrigation will be allocated to the new fields. This may require changes in the distribution 
facilities and rules for mobilizing resources for maintenance. The owners of the new fields 
shouldbeapartofallnegotidons todetermineiftheyagreetocarrytheirshareofmaintenance 
responsibility and if  they  agree to  all other conditions. By encouraging the imgators to 
examine each task essential for operation and maintenance. they  can modify the rules to 
accommodate all changes brought by the project before starting construction. 
For systems with few rules and  little experience in making collective decisions, the 
strategy is more complex. If  holding meetings and making collective decisions constitute a 
new experience for the irrigators, the facilitator’s role becomes crucial but remains one of 
helping the irrigators  take the lead. The objective is to use the construction  activity as a rallying 
point for irrigators to address issues that they know are critical for continued operation and 
maintenance. 
The facilitator can describe multiple ways of accomplishing each task and the merits and 
disadvantages of each. However. such abstract discussion is often mfficult for the irrigators 
to grasp and apply to their own situation. Arranging tours so that the irrigators can observe 
other similar systems and can  discuss these issues firsthand with other fanners is more 
effective. The inventory and other field studies can help identify systems with different sets 
of characteristics.  Systems selected to visit should illustrate differing approaches  used to solve 
problems or cany out activities that must be dealt with by the system receiving assistance. 
Another option for fanner-to-fanner training is to hire a team of irrigators as  consultants 
to the system being assisted. The consultants should be from a number of different systems 
where effective institutions are in place. As consultants, their job is to observe the irrigation 
system and discuss with the irrigators the work that needs to be accomplished. The objective 
is for them to explain how they accomplish similar activities in their own systems. 
Suggesting that the irrigators take responsibility for construction requires them to enter 
into activities that enhance their management capacity. It  also gives them opportunity to 
influence the design selection and  construction methods.  Disagreement over design and 
construction may lead to mistakes but inigators who have taken ownership in their work and 
been responsible for decisions will modify and rebuild deficiencies with minimum criticism. Bibliography 
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